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ABSTRACT
Learning and Risk Aversion. (August 2007)
Carlos Oyarzun, B.A., Universidad de Concepcion;
M.A., Universidad de Chile
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Rajiv Sarin
This dissertation contains three essays on learning and risk aversion. In the
first essay we consider how learning may lead to risk averse behavior. A learning
rule is said to be risk averse if it is expected to add more probability to an action
which provides, with certainty, the expected value of a distribution rather than when
it provides a randomly drawn payoff from this distribution, for every distribution.
We characterize risk averse learning rules. The result reveals that the analysis of
risk averse learning is isomorphic to that of risk averse expected utility maximizers.
A learning rule is said to be monotonically risk averse if it is expected to increase
the probability of choosing the actions whose distribution second-order stochastically
dominates all others in every environment. We characterize monotonically risk averse
learning rules.
In the second essay we analyze risk attitudes for learning within the mean-
variance paradigm. A learning rule is variance-averse if the expected reduced dis-
tribution of payoffs in the next period has a smaller variance than that of the current
reduced distribution, in every set where all the actions provide the same expected
payoff. A learning rule is monotonically variance-averse if it is expected to add prob-
ability to the set of actions that have the smallest variance in the set, when all
the actions have the same expected payoff. A learning rule is monotonically mean-
variance-averse if it is expected to add probability to the set of actions that have the
iv
highest expected payoff and smallest variance whenever this set is not empty. We
characterize monotonically variance-averse and monotonically mean-variance-averse
learning rules.
In the last essay we analyze the social learning process of a group of individuals.
We say that a learning rule is first-order monotone if the number of individuals that
play actions with first-order stochastic dominant payoff distributions is expected to
increase. We characterize these learning rules.
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1CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
One of the advantages of Expected Utility Theory is that it provides a precise notion of
risk aversion. Furthermore, the way to specify risk-averse preferences is well known;
namely, they are described by the concavity of the Bernoulli utility functions. In
applications, such as the construction of general equilibrium models for the analysis
of asset prices, the risk attitudes of the decision maker (and their intensity) are
fundamental for the analysis of the predictions of the model. However, perhaps, one
may not feel comfortable with the expected utility paradigm. This could happen
because of a number of reasons; for example it may be the case that the set up
suggests that the assumptions in which this theory lies on are too strong. Or, it could
be that the implications of the model contradict some fundamental features of the
data under study. In either case attention is directed to alternative theories of decision
making. In applications, we often find economic agents who make decisions according
to alternative paradigms. Unfortunately, the attitudes to risk of these agents seldom
are known. Many times, the proper notion of risk aversion and, consequently, the
way to specify it are missing.
The notion of risk aversion arises naturally in the analysis of preferences; one
person may prefer a safe lottery to a risky lottery. Nevertheless, risk aversion may
arise in different contexts as well; for example, people may tend to choose safer actions
over time. It may reflect a systematic attitude in search of decisions involving less
uncertainty. This dissertation tries to formalize this type of risk aversion.
The objective of this dissertation is to provide suitable notions of risk attitudes
This dissertation follows the style of Journal of Economic Theory.
2for learning and to obtain characterizations specifying the conditions that must be
satisfied for the learning rules that verify those properties. The analysis reveals strong
connections between our theory of risk aversion for learning and Expected Utility
Theory. Many of the definitions and results in our theory rely on the mathematical
structures derived for the analysis of Expected Utility Theory.
The first essay of this dissertation, Chapter II, considers an adaptive learner
who repeatedly faces a problem in which she must choose one action out of a finite
set of actions. Our model is a probabilistic choice model in the sense that each
action is chosen with some probability. After one action is chosen, the decision maker
observes the payoff she obtained. This payoff is a random variable whose probability
distribution is unknown to the decision maker. After choosing an action and obtaining
the corresponding payoff, the decision maker updates her behavior by changing the
probability with which she will choose each action in the next period. We formalize
this process using the learning rule concept. A learning rule is a function mapping
the chosen action and the obtained payoff to a vector of probabilities of choosing each
action in the next period. We introduce two notions of risk aversion for learning rules.
These notions are based on the expected change in the probability of choosing each
action in the set; and risk is measured using Rothschild and Stiglitz [31] second-order
stochastic dominance (sosd) concept. We say that a learning rule is risk-averse if for
every distribution the action is expected to increase the probability of being chosen
when it pays the expected value of the distribution with probability one more than
when it provides a random payoff drawn from the distribution itself. We say that a
learning rule is monotonically risk-averse if it is expected to add probability to the
set of actions that second-order stochastically dominate all the other actions in the
set.
In the second essay of this dissertation we consider a decision maker facing the
3same problem described above. Our objective is, again, to propose notions of risk
aversion for learning rules; however, in this chapter, we use the variance of a distri-
bution to measure risk and, accordingly, our definitions of risk aversion are based on
this concept. We say that a learning rule is variance-averse if the expected reduced-
distribution of payoffs in the next period has a smaller variance than that of the
current reduced-distribution, in every set where all the actions provide the same
expected payoff. We also call a learning rule monotonically variance-averse if it is
expected to add probability to the set of actions that have the smallest variance,
when all the actions have the same expected payoff. Finally, we call a learning rule
monotonically mean-variance-averse if it is expected to add probability to the subset
of actions that have the highest expected payoff and smallest variance whenever this
subset is not empty.
Our definition of risk-averse learning rules is inspired by the definition of risk
aversion in Expected Utility Theory. Our notion of monotonically risk-averse learning
rules, instead, is related to the work of Bo¨rgers, Morales and Sarin [4]. They study
monotone learning rules. A learning rule is monotone if in every environment it is
expected to add probability mass to the set of expected payoff maximizing actions.
Therefore our notion of monotonicity replaces the expected value of the payoff in
Bo¨rgers et al. with the expected value of an arbitrary concave function. Our notion
of monotonically variance-averse learning rules relate to Bo¨rgers et al.’s notion in the
same way, but it replaces expected payoff with variance, and our learning rules seek
to avoid it. Our notion of monotone mean-variance aversion combines monotonicity
in Bo¨rgers et al. with monotone variance aversion.
In the third essay of this dissertation we study the dynamics of choices made by a
population of individuals. In this model each individual has to choose one action every
period. The set of available actions and the corresponding distributions of payoffs
4remain the same from one period to the next. While the set of actions is known, their
payoff distributions are not. Each individual is able to recall the action she played
in the last period and the payoff she obtained; furthermore, she recalls the action
chosen by another member of the population and the payoff he got. We analyze the
imitation rule concept. An imitation rule of a given individual is a function mapping
both the played and observed actions, and the corresponding obtained payoffs, to a
vector of probabilities with which she will play each action in the next period. We
call an imitation rule first-order monotone if the number of individuals that play the
actions more likely to provide higher payoffs is expected to increase in every period.
We characterize these rules and also provide a sufficient condition under which all
the individuals in the population converge to choose these actions. We provide the
analysis of two extensions. The first extension studies properties defined in terms
of the performance at the individual level. The second extension explains how to
introduce concerns for risk within the analysis provided in this essay.
The analytical framework of the third essay is inspired by Schlag’s [33] imitation
model; however, our notion of first-order monotone rules is more similar to the concept
of monotonicity of Bo¨rgers et al. than to the concepts studied by Schlag.
5CHAPTER II
LEARNING AND RISK AVERSION
A. Introduction
Expected Utility Theory (EUT) explains behavior in terms of preferences over, possi-
bly subjective, probability distributions. Preferences are taken as innate and exoge-
nously given. In this essay we take an alternate approach in which the decision maker
need not know that she is choosing among probability distributions. The behavior
of the agent is explained by the manner in which the agent responds to experience.
It is the response to experience that our approach takes as exogenously given. This
essay reveals that the analysis of risk aversion can be developed, in this alternate
approach, in much the same manner as in EUT.
We describe the behavior of an individual by the probabilities with which she
chooses her alternative actions.1 The manner in which the agent responds to expe-
rience is described by a learning rule. For given behavior today, a learning rule is a
mapping from the action played in this period and the payoff obtained to behavior
in the next period. We refer to the payoff distribution associated with each action
as the environment. The environment is assumed to be unknown to the decision
maker.
The focus of this essay is on how learning through experience explains behavior
towards risk. In EUT, preferences are said to be risk-averse if, for every probability
distribution, the expected value of the distribution is preferred to the distribution
itself. In order to define risk aversion for a learning rule, we consider two environ-
1This is commonly assumed in models of learning. For a recent axiomatic foun-
dation of probabilistic behavior in decision making see Gul and Pesendorfer [18].
6ments that differ only in the distributions associated with one of the actions. In the
first environment, the action provides a payoff drawn randomly from a given distri-
bution, whereas in the second environment the expected payoff of that distribution
is provided with certainty. We say that a learning rule is risk-averse if, for any
distribution, the learning rule is expected to add more probability to the action in
the second environment than in the first. Furthermore, we require the above to hold
regardless of the distributions over payoffs obtained from the other actions. Formally,
the definition of when a learning rule is risk-averse replaces the greater expected util-
ity of the action that gives the expected value (rather than the distribution itself),
that describes a risk-averse expected utility maximizer, with being expected to add
greater probability mass to the action that gives the expected value (rather than the
distribution itself).
Our first result shows that a learning rule is risk-averse if and only if the manner
in which it updates the probability of the chosen action is a concave function of the
payoff it receives. This result allows us to develop a theory of the risk attitudes
of learning rules that is isomorphic to that of the risk attitudes of expected utility
maximizers. Our analysis, hence, provides a bridge between decision theory and
learning theory.2
In contrast to decision theory in which the agent selects an (optimal) action
based on her beliefs about the distributions over payoffs of each action, a learning
rule specifies how probability is moved among actions. Therefore, we could ask if
the manner in which the learning rule shifts probability between actions results in
the optimal action(s) being chosen with increased probability. This motivates us to
investigate monotonically risk-averse learning rules, which require that the learning
2For earlier attempts to relate decision theory and learning theory see March [22]
and Simon [35].
7rule is expected to add probability mass on the set of actions whose distributions
second-order stochastically dominate those of all other actions, in every environment.
We provide a characterization of monotonically risk-averse learning rules. The
result shows that how the learning rule updates the probability of unchosen actions,
in response to the payoff obtained from the chosen action, plays a critical role. This
response has to be a convex function of the payoff for each unchosen action. Fur-
thermore, every monotonically risk-averse learning rule satisfies a property we call
impartiality. We say that a learning rule is impartial if there is no expected change
in the probability of playing each action whenever all actions have the same payoff
distribution. The restrictions imposed by impartiality on the functional form of the
learning rule, together with the convex response of unchosen actions, imply that every
monotonically risk-averse learning rule is risk-averse.
We also characterize first-order monotone learning rules which require that the
learning rule be expected to increase probability mass on the set of actions whose
distributions first order stochastically dominate all others. We show that a learning
rule is first-order monotone if and only if it is impartial and the learning rule updates
the probability of each unchosen action according to a decreasing function of the
payoff obtained from the chosen action. This latter condition provides the analogue
of the requirement that Bernoulli utility functions are increasing in EUT. This essay,
therefore, provides a classification of learning rules that is much like the manner in
which EUT classifies Bernoulli utility functions. In particular, our results allow us
to determine how any given learning rule responds to any distribution over payoffs.
Our second and third characterizations provide a generalization of the results
obtained by Bo¨rgers et al., who consider learning rules that are expected to increase
probability on the expected payoff maximizing actions in every environment. They
call such rules monotone. It is straightforward to show that monotone learning rules
8are monotonically risk-averse and first-order monotone. In Section E of this essay, we
show by example, that the class of monotonically risk-averse and first-order monotone
learning rules includes several well known learning rules that are not monotone.
There are some papers that investigate how learning respond to risk. March [22]
and Burgos [6] investigate specific learning rules by way of simulations. Both consider
an environment in which the decision maker has two actions, one of which gives the
expected value of the other (risky) action with certainty. As in our analysis, the
learning rules they consider update behavior using only the information on the payoff
obtained from the chosen action. For the specific rules they consider, they show that
they all choose the safe action more frequently over time. Denrell [12] analytically
shows that a class of learning rules choose the safe action more frequently in the long
run. His result is obtained even if the decision maker follows an optimal policy of
experimentation.3
B. Framework
Let A be the finite set of actions available to the decision maker. Action a ∈ A gives
payoffs according to the distribution function Fa. We shall refer to F = (Fa)a∈A as
the environment the individual faces and we assume that it does not change from one
period to the next. The agent knows the set of actions A but not the distributions
F . The decision maker is assumed to know the finite upper and lower bounds on
the set of possible payoffs X = [xmin, xmax]. We may think of payoffs as monetary
magnitudes.
The behavior of the individual is described by the probability with which she
3For a discussion of the manner in which evolution may affect behavior toward
risk see Dekel and Schotchmer [10] and Robson [27], [28].
9chooses each action. Let behavior today be given by the mixed action vector σ ∈
∆(A), where ∆ (A) denotes the set of all probability distributions over A. We assume
that there is a strictly positive probability that each action is chosen today.4 Taking
the behavior of the agent today as given, a learning rule L specifies her behavior
tomorrow given the action a ∈ A she chooses and the monetary payoff x ∈ X she
obtains today. Hence, L : A×X → ∆(A). The learning rule should be interpreted as
a “reduced form” of the true learning rule. The true learning rule may, for example,
specify how the decision maker updates her beliefs about the payoff distributions in
response to her observations and how these beliefs are translated into behavior. If
one combines the two steps of belief adjustment and behavior change we get a learning
rule as we define.5
Let L(a′,x) (a) denote the probability with which a is chosen in the next period
if a′ was chosen today and a payoff of x was received. For a given learning rule
L and environment F , the expected movement of probability mass on action a is
f (a) :=
∑
a′∈A σa′
∫
L(a′,x) (a) dFa′ (x)− σa.
Denote the expected payoff associated with Fa by pia. Let the distributions
over payoffs of actions other than a be denoted by F−a. The definition of when a
learning rule is risk-averse requires that if we replace the distribution Fa with another
distribution F˜a which puts all probability on pia and keep F−a fixed, then the learning
rule is expected to add more probability mass to a when it gives payoffs according to
F˜a than when it gives payoffs according to Fa. This should be true for all a, Fa and
F−a. More formally, we introduce a second associated environment F˜ =
(
F˜a, F˜−a
)
in
4This assumption can be dropped with minor changes in the proofs though it
would require additional notation.
5Notice that we do not restrict the state space of the learning rule to be the
probability simplex ∆ (A). The examples in Section E illustrate this.
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which F˜−a = F−a. Hence, environment F˜ has the same set of actions as environment
F and the distribution over payoffs of all actions other than a are as in F . Let
f˜ (a) denote the expected movement of probability mass on action a in the associated
environment F˜ .
Definition 1 A learning rule L is risk-averse if for all a and F , if F˜a places all
probability mass on pia then f˜ (a) ≥ f (a).
Risk seeking and risk neutral learning rules may be defined in the obvious manner.
As the analysis of such learning rules involves a straightforward extension we do
not pursue it further in the sequel. The risk aversion of the learning rule may be
considered a “local” concept as we have taken the current state as given. If the
current state of learning is represented by an element s ∈ S which is a subset of
finite dimensional Euclidean space then the risk aversion of a learning rule “in the
large” could be considered by defining a learning rule to be globally risk-averse if it
is risk-averse at all states s ∈ S. Our work provides a first step in the analysis of
globally risk-averse learning rules.
The contrast between when a learning rule is risk-averse and when an expected
utility maximizer is risk-averse is instructive. In EUT an individual is called risk-
averse if for all distributions Fa the individual prefers F˜a to Fa. Hence, the von
Neumann-Morgenstern utilities v satisfy
v
(
F˜a
)
=
∫
u (x) dF˜a (x) ≥
∫
u (x) dFa (x) = v (Fa) , (2.1)
where u (·) is often referred to as the Bernoulli utility function. A learning rule is
called risk-averse if for all actions a and distributions Fa the learning rule is expected
to add more probability mass to an action that gives pia with certainty than to an
action that gives payoffs according to Fa regardless of the distributions F−a. Hence,
11
risk aversion in learning requires that f˜ (a) ≥ f (a), i.e.,
∑
a′∈A
σa′
∫
L(a′,x) (a) dF˜a′ (x)− σa ≥
∑
a′∈A
σa′
∫
L(a′,x) (a) dFa′ (x)− σa. (2.2)
Notice that, whereas v (.) in EUT depends only on the payoff distribution of a single
action, f (.) in learning theory depends on the distribution of the entire vector of
distributions.
C. Risk-Averse Learning
In this section we state our results regarding risk-averse learning rules and their rela-
tionship to results concerning risk-averse expected utility maximizers. The following
definition provides some useful terminology.
Definition 2 A learning rule L is own-concave if for all a, L(a,x) (a) is a concave
function of x.
A learning rule tells us how the probability of each action a′ ∈ A is updated upon
choosing any action a and receiving a payoff x. Own-concavity of a learning rule
places a restriction only on the manner in which the updated probability of action a
depends upon x given that a is chosen.
Proposition 1 A learning rule L is risk-averse if and only if it is own-concave.
Proof. We begin by proving that every own-concave learning rule is risk-averse.
Consider any own-concave learning rule L and environment F = (Fa, F−a). Construct
the associated environment F˜ in which F˜a places all probability mass on pia (and
F−a = F˜−a). By Jensen’s inequality,
L(a,pia) (a) ≥
∫
L(a,x) (a) dFa (x) (2.3)
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⇐⇒ ∫
L(a,x) (a) dF˜a (x) ≥
∫
L(a,x) (a) dFa (x) (2.4)
⇐⇒
σa
∫
L(a,x) (a) dF˜a (x) +
∑
a′ 6=a
σa′
∫
L(a′,x) (a) dF˜a′ (x)− σa (2.5)
≥ σa
∫
L(a,x) (a) dFa (x) +
∑
a′ 6=a
σa′
∫
L(a′,x) (a) dFa′ (x)− σa (2.6)
⇐⇒
f˜ (a) ≥ f (a) . (2.7)
Hence, the learning rule is risk-averse.
We now turn to prove that every risk-averse learning rule L is own-concave. We
argue by contradiction. Suppose L is risk-averse but not own-concave. Because L is
not own-concave there exists an action a, payoffs x′, x′′ ∈ [xmin, xmax] and λ ∈ (0, 1)
such that
L(a,λx′+(1−λ)x′′) (a) < λL(a,x′) (a) + (1− λ)L(a,x′′) (a) . (2.8)
Now consider an environment F in which Fa gives x
′ with probability λ and x′′
with probability (1− λ) and the distributions of the other actions are given by F−a.
Consider the associated environment F˜ in which F˜a gives pia = λx
′ + (1− λ)x′′ with
probability one. Hence,∫
L(a,x) (a) dF˜a (x) = L(a,pia) (a) (2.9)
< λL(a,x′) (a) + (1− λ)L(a,x′′) (a) (2.10)
=
∫
L(a,x) (a) dFa (x) . (2.11)
which implies f˜ (a) < f (a) by the argument above. Hence, the rule is not risk-averse
as we had assumed and we obtain a contradiction. ¤
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Proposition 1 shows that the own-concavity of a learning rule in learning theory
plays an analogous role as the concavity of the Bernoulli utility function in EUT. In
the latter theory the curvature properties of a Bernoulli utility function explain the
individuals attitudes towards risk. In the theory of learning, the manner in which the
learning rule updates the probability of the chosen action in response to the payoff it
obtains explains how learning responds to risk. The proof reveals that for any action
a the distributions of actions a′ 6= a do not play any role when we compare f˜ (a)
and f (a). This has the consequence that the theory of risk-averse learning rules is
isomorphic to the theory of risk-averse expected utility maximizers.
For example, if L(a,x) (a) is a twice differentiable function of x, we can adapt the
well known Arrow-Pratt measure of absolute risk aversion (Arrow [2], Pratt [26]) to
find an easy measure of the risk aversion of a learning rule. Specifically, we define
the coefficient of absolute risk aversion of a learning rule L for action a as
arLa (x) = −∂
2L(a,x) (a) /∂x
2
∂L(a,x) (a) /∂x
. (2.12)
In EUT a distribution Fa is said to be more risky than another F˜a if both have
the same mean and every risk-averse person prefers F˜a to Fa (see, e.g., Rothschild
and Stiglitz [31]). In this case it is usually said that F˜a second-order stochastically
dominates (sosd) Fa. The following Corollary shows that an analogous result applies
in our case.
Corollary 1 F˜a second-order stochastically dominates Fa if and only if f˜ (a) ≥ f (a)
for all a for every risk-averse learning rule.
Proof. f˜ (a) ≥ f (a) for every risk-averse learning rule
⇐⇒∫
L(a,x) (a) dF˜a (x) ≥
∫
L(a,x) (a) dFa (x) for every own-concave L
14
⇐⇒
F˜a second-order stochastically dominates Fa. ¤
For risk-averse learning rules, imposing the requirement that probabilities of all
actions must sum to one provides the obvious restrictions when there are only two
actions. However, few restrictions are imposed when there are three or more actions.
The property we study in the next section provides such restrictions.
D. Monotonic Risk Aversion
The definition of a risk-averse learning rule was inspired by standard decision theory.
Learning, however, differs in many respects from choice. Whereas in decision theory a
single (and optimal) action is chosen, in learning theory probability is moved between
actions. For learning, it then appears reasonable to ask whether probability on
the optimal action is increased from one period to the next. Our next definition
introduces such a property. Specifically, a learning rule is said to be monotonically
risk-averse if it is expected to increase probability on the best actions, in a sosd sense,
in every environment.
Let A∗ denote the set of actions that second-order stochastically dominate all
other actions. That is, A∗ := {a ∈ A : Fa sosd Fa′ ∀ a′ ∈ A}. Clearly, if A∗ = A we
have that Fa = Fa′ for all a, a
′ ∈ A. For any subset Aˆ ⊂ A, let f
(
Aˆ
)
:= Σa∈Aˆf (a).
Definition 3 A learning rule L is monotonically risk-averse if in all environments
we have that f (A∗) ≥ 0.
Correspondingly, we say that a learning rule is monotonically risk seeking if
f (A∗) ≤ 0 in every environment and a learning rule is monotonically risk neutral if
it is monotonically risk-averse and monotonically risk seeking. The analysis of such
rules is analogous to the analysis of monotonically risk-averse learning rules provided
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below. Note that, when A∗ is empty, expected utility maximization by a risk-averse
agent places no specific restrictions on behavior. This has the analogue, in our
analysis, that no restrictions are placed on the movement of probability when A∗ is
empty.
Now, we proceed to characterize monotonically risk-averse learning rules. The
following definition introduces some useful terminology.
Definition 4 A learning rule L is cross-convex if for all a, L(a′x) (a) is convex in x
for all a′ 6= a.
We shall see in the next result that all monotonically risk-averse learning rules
have the feature that if all actions have the same distribution of payoffs then there
is no expected movement in probability mass on any action. We call such learning
rules impartial.
Definition 5 A learning rule L is impartial if f (a) = 0 for all a whenever Fa = Fa′
for all a, a′ ∈ A.
The set of impartial learning rules is related to the unbiased learning rules studied
in Bo¨rgers et al. Unbiasedness requires that no probability mass is expected to be
moved among actions when all have the same expected payoff. Clearly, the set of
impartial learning rules is larger than the set of unbiased learning rules. Furthermore,
it is straightforward to see that unbiased learning rules cannot respond to aspects of
the distribution of payoffs other than the mean.6
Proposition 2 A learning rule L is monotonically risk-averse if and only if (i) σa =∑
a′∈A σa′L(a′,x)(a) for all a, and (ii) L is cross-convex.
6From the analysis below, it is not difficult to see that a learning rule is unbiased
if and only if it is monotonically risk neutral.
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Our proof begins with two Lemmas. The first shows that all monotonically risk-
averse learning rules are impartial and the second characterizes impartial learning
rules.
Lemma 1 If the learning rule L is monotonically risk-averse then it is impartial.
Proof. The proof is by contradiction. Suppose L is monotonically risk-averse but
there exists an environment F with A = A∗ and f(a) > 0 for some a ∈ A. If Fa does
not place strictly positive probability on (xmin, xmax), then consider the environment
F̂ such that, for all action a ∈ A, the probabilities of xmin and xmax are (1− ε) times
their corresponding probabilities in the environment F , and the probability of some
x ∈ (xmin, xmax) is ε. If Fa places strictly positive probability on (xmin, xmax), then
let F̂ = F. We now construct the environment F˜ in which F˜a is a mean preserving
spread of F̂a and F˜a′ = F̂a′ for all a
′ 6= a. Specifically, suppose that F˜a is obtained by
assigning to every interval I ⊂ [xmin, xmax] only (1 − ε) times the probability it had
under F̂a and then adding (pia− xmin)ε/(xmax− xmin) on the probability of xmax and
(xmax− pia)ε/(xmax− xmin) on the probability of xmin. By construction, F˜a′ sosd F˜a
for all a′ 6= a. It follows that A˜∗ = A\{a}. Since f˜(a) can be written as a continuous
function in ε, there exists a small enough ε such that f˜(a) > 0. This contradicts
that L is monotonically risk-averse. ¤
Lemma 2 A learning rule L is impartial if and only if for all a ∈ A and x ∈ X, it
satisfies σa =
∑
a′∈A σa′L(a′,x)(a).
Proof. Necessity.
Consider an environment where all the actions pay x with probability one. Then,
for all a ∈ A,
f(a) =
∑
a′∈A
σa′L(a′,x)(a)− σa. (2.13)
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Therefore, in order to be impartial L must satisfy
σa =
∑
a′∈A
σa′L(a′,x)(a). (2.14)
Sufficiency.
Consider the environment F such that Fa = Fa′ for all a, a
′ ∈ A.
f(a) =
∑
a′∈A
σa′
∫
L(a′,x)(a)dFa′(x)− σa (2.15)
=
∫ ∑
a′∈A
σa′L(a′,x)(a)dFa(x)− σa (2.16)
= 0. (2.17)
The second statement follows from the fact that all the distributions are the same,
and the third statement follows from the hypothesis. ¤
Proof of Proposition 2.
Sufficiency.
Consider a ∈ A∗
f (a) = σa
∫
L(a,x)(a)dFa(x) +
∑
a′ 6=a
σa′
∫
L(a′,x)(a)dFa′(x)− σa (2.18)
=
∑
a′ 6=a
σa′ [
∫
L(a′,x)(a)dFa′(x)−
∫
L(a′,x)(a)dFa(x)] (2.19)
≥ 0. (2.20)
The second statement follows from Lemmas 1 and 2 and the last inequality follows
from the fact that a ∈ A∗ and the convexity of the functions L(a′,x)(a) for all a′ ∈
A\{a}.
Necessity.
We argue by contradiction. Suppose that for some a ∈ A and some a′ ∈ A\{a},
L(a′,x)(a) is not convex. Therefore there exists x
′, x′′, λ ∈ (0, 1) and x := λx′ + (1−
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λ)x′′ such that λL(a′,x′)(a) + (1− λ)L(a′,x′′)(a) < L(a′,x)(a). Consider an environment
where a′ ∈ A\{a} pays x′ with probability λ, and x′′ with probability (1−λ). Action
a pays x with probability one, and all the other actions in the set, if any, pay x with
probability 1 − ε, x′ with probability ελ, and x′′ with probability ε(1 − λ). Clearly,
A∗ = {a}. From the sufficiency part we know
f(a) =
∑
a′ 6=a
σa′ [
∫
L(a′,x)(a)dFa′(x)−
∫
L(a′,x)(a)dFa(x)] (2.21)
= σa′ [λL(a′,x′)(a) + (1− λ)L(a′,x′′)(a)− L(a′,x)(a)] (2.22)
+ε
∑
a′′ 6=a,a′
σa′′ [λL(a′′,x′)(a) + (1− λ)L(a′′,x′′)(a)− L(a′′,x)(a)]. (2.23)
Therefore, for small enough ε, f(a) < 0. ¤
Monotonic risk aversion places restrictions on how the learning rule updates the
probability of each unchosen action as a function of the action chosen and payoff
obtained. In particular, it requires this function be convex in the payoff received, for
each unchosen action. Furthermore, we show that all such rules have the weak con-
sistency property of impartiality. Because every impartial and cross-convex learning
rule is own-concave we have the following Corollary.
Corollary 2 Every monotonically risk-averse learning rule L is risk-averse.
The analysis above can be extended to the concept of first-order stochastic dom-
inance. In EUT a distribution Fa is said to first order stochastically dominate (fosd)
another F˜a if every individual with an increasing (Bernoulli) utility function prefers
the former. In the context of our analysis, we would like to identify the learning rules
that are expected to add probability mass on the set of actions whose distributions
fosd the distributions of all the other actions, in every environment. We call such
learning rules first-order monotone. Let A∗∗ := {a ∈ A : a fosd a′ for all a′ ∈ A}.
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Definition 6 A learning rule L is first-order monotone if f(A∗∗) ≥ 0 in every envi-
ronment.
First-order monotone learning rules can be characterized in the same manner as
monotonically risk-averse learning rules. In particular, these rules need to be impar-
tial but instead of being cross-convex they require the response of the probabilities
of playing the unchosen actions to be decreasing in the obtained payoff.
Definition 7 A learning rule L is cross-decreasing if for all a, L(a′x) (a) is decreasing
in x for all a′ 6= a.
Proposition 3 A learning rule is first-order monotone if and only if it satisfies (i)
σa =
∑
a′∈A σa′L(a′,x)(a) for all a ∈ A and (ii) L is cross-decreasing.
In order to prove this result we begin with the following Lemma, the proof of
which closely parallels that of Lemma 1.
Lemma 3 Every first-order monotone learning rule L is impartial.
Proof. We argue by contradiction. Consider an environment F with A = A∗∗ and
suppose that f(a) < 0 for some a ∈ A. Now we construct an environment F̂ where
Â∗∗ = {a}. We construct F̂a by assigning to every interval I ⊂ X only (1− ε) times
the probability it had under Fa and adding ε to the probability of xmax. We construct
F̂a′ for all a
′ ∈ A\{a} by assigning to every interval I ⊂ X only (1 − ε) times the
probability it had under Fa′ and then adding ε to the probability of xmin. Clearly,
Â∗∗ = {a}. Since f̂(a) can be written as a continuous function in ε, for small enough
ε we have f̂(a) < 0. Therefore L is not first-order monotone. ¤
Proof of Proposition 3.
Necessity.
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The necessity of (i) follows from Lemma 3 and Lemma 2. To prove the necessity
of (ii) we argue by contradiction. Suppose that for some a ∈ A and a′ ∈ A\{a},
there are x and x′ with x′ < x and L(a′,x)(a) > L(a′,x′)(a). Consider the environment
F where action a pays x with probability one and action a′ pays x′ with probability
one. All the other actions a′′ ∈ A\{a, a′}, if any, pay x with probability 1− ε and x′
with probability ε. Clearly, A∗∗ = {a}. From Lemma 2 and Lemma 3, we have that
f(a) =
∑
a′ 6=a
σa′
[∫
L(a′,x)(a)dFa′(x)−
∫
L(a′,x)(a)dFa(x)
]
(2.24)
= σa′
[
L(a′,x′)(a)− L(a′,x)(a)
]
+
∑
a′′ 6=a,a′
εσa′′
[
L(a′′,x′)(a)− L(a′′,x)(a)
]
.(2.25)
For small enough ε, f(a) < 0, which contradicts first-order monotonicity.
Sufficiency.
As in the proof of Proposition 2, consider a ∈ A∗∗, then
f(a) =
∑
a′ 6=a
σa′
[∫
L(a′,x)(a)dFa′(x)−
∫
L(a′,x)(a)dFa(x)
]
(2.26)
≥ 0. (2.27)
The last inequality follows from the fact that a ∈ A∗∗ and the fact that L(a′,x)(a) is
decreasing for all a′ ∈ A\{a}. ¤
The notion of risk-averse learning of Section C may be extended to first-order
stochastic dominance in a similar manner. We can identify a set of learning rules
such that for every action a and distribution Fa, if that distribution is replaced by a
distribution F˜a, such that F˜a fosd Fa, then f˜(a) ≥ f(a), in every environment F. It
is easy to show that this set of learning rules is equivalent to the set of learning rules
for which L(a,x)(a) is increasing in x for all a ∈ A.
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E. Examples
The Cross learning rule (Cross [8]) is given by
L(a,x) (a) = σa + (1− σa)x (2.28)
L(a′,x) (a) = σa − σax ∀a′ 6= a, (2.29)
where x ∈ [0, 1]. It is easily seen that the Cross learning rule is impartial. Fur-
thermore, its cross-components are affine transformations of x. Therefore this rule
is monotonically risk neutral and hence it is also risk neutral. It is also clearly
first-order monotone.
The Roth and Erev [29] learning rule describes the state of learning s of an agent
by a vector v ∈ R|A|++. The vector v describes the decision makers “attraction” to
choose any of her |A| actions. Given v, the agents behavior is given by σa = va/Σa′va′
for all a. If the agent plays a and receives a payoff of x then she adds x to her
attraction to play a, leaving all other attractions unchanged. Hence, the Roth and
Erev learning rule is given by
Lv(a,x) (a) =
va + x
Σa′′va′′ + x
(2.30)
Lv(a′,x) (a) =
va
Σa′′va′′ + x
∀a′ 6= a, (2.31)
where x ∈ [0, xmax] and the superscript v on the learning rule defines it at that state
of learning. Using Lemma 2, it is easy to check that this rule is impartial. Observing
that the cross-components Lv(a′,x) (a) are decreasing convex functions of x for all a
′ 6= a,
we see that this learning rule is first-order monotone and monotonically risk-averse.
The coefficient of absolute risk aversion of this learning rule is arLa = 2/ (Σa′va′ + x)
for all a. Clearly, arLa decreases as Σa′va′ increases and hence this learning rule
exhibits declining absolute risk aversion. Note that this rule satisfies none of the
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properties studied by Bo¨rgers et al. who have shown that this rule is neither monotone
nor unbiased.
Our next example considers the weighted return model studied in March [22].
This learning rule is risk-averse but may not be monotonically risk-averse. The state
of learning is described by a vector of attractions v ∈ R|A|++. Given v, the agents
behavior is given by σa = va/Σa′va′ for all a. If action a is chosen and receives
a payoff of x then she adds β (x− va) to her attraction of a, where β ∈ (0, 1) is a
parameter, leaving all other attractions unchanged. Thus, the learning rule may be
written as
Lυ(a,x)(a) =
υa + β(x− υa)∑
a′′∈A υa′′ + β(x− υa)
(2.32)
Lυ(a′,x)(a) =
υa∑
a′′∈A υa′′ + β(x− υa′)
∀a′ 6= a, (2.33)
where x ∈ [0, xmax]. It follows that this learning rule is risk-averse (as Lv(a,x) (a) is a
concave function of x). However, this learning rule is monotonically risk-averse and
first-order monotone only if va = va′ for all a, a
′ ∈ A (because otherwise it fails to be
impartial). The analysis of the average return model studied by March [22] which
replaces β with βa = 1/ (κa + 1), where κa is the number of times action a has been
chosen in the past, is similar.
Another learning rule that has received considerable attention is the logistic
fictitious play with partial feedback studied by Fudenberg and Levine [17], section
4.8.4. The agent is described by the |A| × 2 matrix (v, κ) where κa denotes the
number of times action a has been chosen, κ = (κa)a∈A, and v = (va)a∈A gives the
vector of attractions. The next period attraction of an action that was chosen today
is its current attraction plus (x− va) / (κa + 1). The attractions of unchosen actions
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are not updated. The learning rule is specified as
Lv,κ(a,x) (a) =
eva+(x−va)/(κa+1)
eva+(x−va)/(κa+1) +
∑
a′ 6=a e
va′
(2.34)
Lv,κ(a′,x) (a) =
eva
eva′+(x−va′ )/(κa′+1) +
∑
a′′ 6=a′ e
va′′
∀a′ 6= a (2.35)
This learning rule is neither risk-averse nor risk seeking because the curvature of
Lv,κ(a,x) (a) depends on the payoff obtained. Specifically, L
v,κ
(a,x) (a) is concave in x (at
σ) for the part of the domain in which x ≥ va + (κa + 1) [ln (1− σa)− ln σa] and is
convex otherwise. Nevertheless, this rule is first-order monotone when va = va′ and
κa = κa′ for all a, a
′ ∈ A. The analysis of the risk attitudes of several other learning
rules (e.g. minimal information versions of Camerer and Ho [7] and Rustichini [32]),
which use a logistic transformation of the attractions to obtain the probabilities with
which each action is chosen, is closely related.
F. Discussion
In models of learning probability distributions over actions change from one period
to the next in response to some experience. Monotonic risk aversion focuses only
on the manner in which the probability of the best actions being chosen changes
from one period to the next. This parallels decision theory’s focus on the best
action. However, for learning, we could look at the entire probability distribution
chosen in the next period. Noting that this probability distribution on actions
generates a (reduced) distribution over payoffs, which is a weighted average of the
payoff distribution of each of the actions, we could ask whether the learning rule is
such that expected behavior tomorrow generates a distribution over payoffs which
second-order stochastically dominates that of today in every environment. Such a
property turns out to be too restrictive. It can be shown that, in environments with
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only two actions, the only learning rules which satisfy this condition are the unbiased
rules studied by Bo¨rgers et al. Unbiased rules exhibit zero expected movement in
probability mass when all actions have the same expected payoffs. Such rules satisfy
the above condition in a trivial manner because the expected distribution tomorrow
is the same as today.7 Restricting the set of environments on which the improvement
is required would lead us to identify a larger class of learning rules.8 We do not
pursue this approach in the current analysis.
All the properties we have studied in this chapter have referred to the expected
movement of a learning rule. This arises naturally when describing the behavior of
the population of individuals each of whom faces the same decision problem. The
expected movement of a learning rule has also been studied on many previous occa-
sions when interest has focused on the long run properties of a learning rule. As is
well known under conditions of slow learning the actual movement of a learning rule
closely approximate it’s expected movement.9 Combining properties of the expected
movement and of the speed of learning inform us about the long term properties of
learning rules.
This essay has focused on short term and local properties of learning. Often,
however, the long run properties of learning rules are of interest and such an analysis
requires us to look at properties that hold globally. That is, the local property
would need to hold for each state of learning. This subject, which would require the
7It can also be shown that unbiased learning rules are the only learning rules which
are continuous in x for all a, a′ ∈ A and satisfy ∑a (σa + f (a))Fa sosd ∑a σaFa in
every environment.
8For example, we could consider learning rules that satisfy
∑
a (σa + f (a))Fa sosd∑
a σaFa in every environment that is completely ordered by the sosd relation. It
can be shown that a learning rule is continuous in payoffs and satisfies this condition
if and only if it is monotonically risk-averse.
9See, for example, Bo¨rgers and Sarin [5].
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analysis of risk attitudes at each state of learning, is outside the scope of the present
study and we leave it for future work. For the examples we discussed in Section E,
we are often able to say if the learning rule is globally (monotonically) risk-averse.
This is obviously true for the Cross learning rule and the Roth and Erev learning
rule which are monotonically risk neutral and monotonically risk-averse at all states,
respectively. The weighted return model of March is globally risk-averse though not
globally monotonically risk-averse and the logistic fictitious play learning rule is not
globally risk-averse.
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CHAPTER III
MEAN AND VARIANCE RESPONSIVE LEARNING
A. Introduction
A popular and commonly used measure of the “risk” of a distribution is its variance.
Following the seminal papers by Markowitz [23] and Tobin [36] many studies in finance
and monetary economics have analyzed alternative distributions of payoffs according
to their mean and variance. This literature describes people as seeking higher means
and lower variances. If behavior is, to some extent, learnt then it is likely that the
learning rules people use lead them to choose actions with higher means and lower
variances. In this essay we study such learning rules.1
We consider learning rules in which the agent has very little prior and feedback
information about her environment. She knows the set of actions and chooses each
with positive probability.2 The agent does not know the distribution of payoffs from
any action. In any period, information is obtained about the action chosen and the
payoff received. We focus on how this information is used to modify behavior from one
period to the next. Since the change in behavior depends on the payoff obtained, the
payoff distributions associated with the different actions will determine the expected
change in behavior. We refer to this set of distributions as the environment faced by
the agent.
Our analysis begins by considering environments in which all actions have the
same mean but differ according to their variances. We call a learning rule variance-
1We know of no paper that studies learning rules that respond to both the mean
and the variance of a distribution. See Fudenberg and Levine [17] for a comprehensive
study of the subject.
2This is a common assumption in learning models. Gul and Pesendorfer [18]
provide an axiomatic foundation for such probabilistic choice behavior.
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averse if it is expected to result in behavior tomorrow that has a lower variance in
every such environment. We call a learning rule monotonically variance-averse if
the probability with which it chooses the variance minimizing actions is expected to
increase in every such environment. We show that variance-averse and monotonically
variance-averse rules satisfy a consistency condition that we call weak unbiasedness
which requires that there is no expected movement in probability on any action if
all actions have the same variance (and the same expected payoff). We characterize
all weakly unbiased learning rules. All such learning rules allow for a polynomial of
order two transformation of payoffs, in which the coefficients of the transformation
are allowed to depend on the action chosen and the action whose probability is being
updated, before applying Cross’ learning rule (Cross [8]).
We characterize all monotonically variance-averse learning rules. Such rules
place restrictions on the coefficients of the quadratic transformation of payoffs. We
also prove that all monotonically variance-averse learning rules are variance-averse,
which in turn we show to be a strict subset of the set of weakly unbiased learning
rules.
Our main result considers learning rules in environments in which actions may
have different expected payoffs and different variances of payoffs.3 We now study
monotonically mean-variance-averse rules which require that the probability with
which actions which have the highest means and lowest variances, provided they ex-
ist, is expected to increase. We characterize monotonically mean-variance-averse
rules. Such rules have to be monotonically variance-averse. Additionally, the char-
acterization reveals the restrictions on the relative sizes of the coefficients of the linear
and quadratic terms that appear in weakly unbiased learning rules. Intuitively, both
3In such environments, we show that a monotonically variance-averse learning rule
may lead to lower expected payoffs.
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linear and quadratic terms arise because the learning rule has to respond to both the
mean and the variance of the distribution.
We show that monotonically mean-variance-averse rules are expected to move
behavior toward lower variance actions in environments in which all actions have the
same expected payoff. Furthermore, they move behavior toward higher expected
payoffs in environments in which all actions have the same variance. Hence, they
capture certain features of rules that respond only to the first moment of payoffs and
those that respond only to the second moment of payoffs.
The analysis in this essay complements that in Bo¨rgers et al. and the results
provided in Chapter II. Bo¨rgers et al. characterize monotonic learning rules which
are expected to increase probability mass on the expected payoff maximizing actions.
Chapter II characterizes monotonically risk-averse learning rules which are expected
to increase probability mass on the actions whose distributions second-order stochas-
tically dominate (sosd) all other actions. In contrast to Bo¨rgers et al. which is
concerned with the mean of a distribution and the analysis in Chapter II, which is
concerned with its risk as measured by sosd, this essay considers learning rules that
respond to both the mean of the distribution and its variance, where the latter is used
as a measure of risk. Bo¨rgers et al. (respectively, the analysis in Chapter II) find
that a learning rule is monotonic (respectively, monotonically risk-averse) if and only
if the agent transforms the payoff in an affine (respectively, concave) manner. The
transformation of payoffs is allowed to depend on the action chosen and the action
whose probability is being updated.
Given the results in Bo¨rgers et al. and those in Chapter II, the main results
provided here may not seem surprising. The arguments involved in it, however, need
to be considerably different. This is especially true in the characterization of weakly
unbiased learning rules. More importantly, our results allow us to describe agents
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whose learning responds to two different features of a distribution. Responding to the
first two moments of a distribution seems both to be intuitive and what is observed
in experimental data (see, e.g., Erev, Bereby-Meyer and Roth [16] and Haruvy, Erev
and Sonsino [20]).
March [22], Denrell and March [13] and Burgos [6] investigate how specific learn-
ing rules respond to risk by way of simulations. Denrell [12] analytically considers
the long term properties of some learning rules in the same informational setting as
this essay. He finds a class of adaptive learning rules that lead to more risk-averse
choices in the long run. Also related is Della Vigna and Li Calzi [11] which pays close
attention to the long run risk attitudes of a specific learning rule. The learning rule
they consider, however, assumes more knowledge about the environment than the
rules we consider. Finally, the work of Karni and Schmeidler [21] and Robson [27],
[28] is related. In their work current preferences over gambles, i.e., risk attitudes, are
the result of an evolutionary process in which either the expected number of offspring
or the probability of survival is maximized.
This essay is structured as follows. In the next section we introduce the frame-
work. Section C and Section D consider the case in which all actions have the same
expected payoff. Section C characterizes learning rules which satisfy a weak consis-
tency requirement that all variance-averse and monotonically variance-averse learning
rules need to satisfy. Section D characterizes monotonically variance-averse rules and
provides some necessary and some sufficient conditions for variance-averse rules. In
Section E we consider environments in which actions have different means and vari-
ances of payoff and provide results concerning monotonically mean-variance-averse
rules. Section F provides some concluding comments.
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B. Framework
The decision maker has a finite number of actions a ∈ A. Payoffs are interpreted as
monetary magnitudes that lie in some bounded interval known to the decision maker
which we normalize to be [0, 1].4 For any subsetD ⊂ [0, 1] the probability that a gives
a payoff in D is µa (D).
5 Let µ = (µa)a∈A denote the vector of probability measures
associated with each action. We refer to E ≡ (A, µ) as an environment. The
expected payoff from action a is denoted pia =
∫ 1
0
xdµa and A
∗ := {a ∈ A : pia ≥pia′
∀ a′ ∈ A} denotes the set of expected payoff maximizing actions. Let ξa =
∫ 1
0
x2dµa
denote the second moment of payoffs of action a. The variance of payoffs of action
a is given by ρa = ξa − pi2a. Let A∗ := {a ∈ A : ρa ≤ρa′ ∀ a′ ∈ A} denote the set of
variance minimizing actions.
The individual knows the set of actions A but does not know µ. She chooses
among her actions today according to the mixed action vector σ ∈ ∆(A), where
∆ (A) is the set of all probability distributions over A. σ describes the behavior of
the individual today. We assume that σ lies in the interior of the simplex ∆ (A).6
The expected payoff associated with σ is piσ = Σaσapia and the variance associated
with it is ρσ = Σaσaξa − pi2σ.
A learning rule specifies the individuals behavior tomorrow as a function of her
behavior today, the action she chooses and the payoff she obtains. The learning
rule should be viewed as a “reduced form” of the true learning process. The true
learning rule may, for example, specify how the decision maker updates her beliefs
and how these beliefs are transformed into behavior. Combining the two steps of
4This normalization is without loss of generality for our results.
5The probability that action a gives a payoff x is denoted by µa (x).
6It is easy to show that the properties of learning rules investigated in this essay
cannot be satisfied if this condition is violated.
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behavior updating and belief change we get the learning rule we specify. We shall
assume the behavior today is given and fixed and hence we may write a learning rule
as L : A× [0, 1]→ ∆(A).
Denote by L(a′,x) (a) the probability that the learning rule L assigns to action
a tomorrow if action a′ was chosen today and a payoff of x is received. Fix an
environment and a learning rule. Then, the expected change in the probability of
action a is given by f (a) = Σa′∈Aσa′
∫ 1
0
L(a′,x) (a) dµa′−σa. For any subset of actions,
A˜ ⊂ A, let f
(
A˜
)
denote the expected change in probability mass on that subset.
That is, f
(
A˜
)
= Σa∈A˜f (a). The expected change in expected payoffs is given
by g = Σaf (a)pia. The expected change in the variance of the payoff is given by
h = Σa∈Af (a) ξa −
[
E (piσ′)
2 − (piσ)2
]
, where σ′ is the next period behavior and the
expectation E is taken with regard to its value.
We shall begin our analysis by studying environments in which each action gives
the same expected payoff which we refer to as flat environments.
Definition 8 An environment is flat if pia = pia′ for all a, a
′ ∈ A.
In flat environments A = A∗ and h = Σaf (a) ξa. We begin our analysis with
flat environments because this allows us to isolate the effect of (payoff) variance on
the learning rule. We now introduce two properties of learning rules which pertain
to their behavior in flat environments.
Definition 9 A learning rule is variance-averse (/neutral/ seeking/) if for all flat
environments with A 6= A∗, h < (/ = / > /) 0.
In words, a learning rule is said to be variance-averse (/neutral/seeking/) if in
all environments in which each action has the same expected payoff, but at least
two actions have a different variance of payoff, the expected change in the variance
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of payoff is strictly negative (/zero/strictly positive/). Hence, a learning rule is
variance-averse if it is expected to lead to a strict reduction in the variance of payoff
from one period to the next, provided the environment stays the same.
Definition 10 A learning rule is monotonically variance-averse (/neutral/ seeking/)
if in all flat environments with A 6= A∗, f (A∗) > (/ = / < /) 0.
In words, a learning rule is monotonically variance-averse (/neutral/seeking/) if
in all environments in which each action has the same expected payoff, but at least two
actions have a different variance of payoff, the expected change in the probability with
which the variance minimizing actions are chosen is strictly positive (/zero/strictly
negative/).7
Remark 1 If |A| = 2 then a learning rule is variance-averse (/neutral/seeking/) if
and only if the leaning rule is monotonically variance-averse (/neutral/seeking/).
We end this section with an example of a learning rule due to Cross (1973).
Example 1 Cross Learning rule
L(a,x) (a) = σa + (1− σa)x (3.1)
L(a,x) (a
′) = σa′ − σa′x ∀a′ 6= a (3.2)
In the Cross learning rule,
f (a) = σa (pia − Σa′σa′pia′) (3.3)
7An alternate, and perhaps more intuitive way to define monotonically variance
seeking rules, could be as those learning rules that satisfy f (A∗−) > 0, where A∗− :={a ∈ A : ρa ≥ρa′ ∀ a′ ∈ A} in every environment with A 6= A∗. It turns out that the
learning rules for which f (A∗−) > 0 are precisely those for which f (A∗) < 0 for all
flat environments with A 6= A∗.
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for all a ∈ A. In flat sets, f (a) = 0 for all a and
h = Σa∈Aσaξa (pia − Σa′σa′pia′) = 0. (3.4)
Hence, this rule is variance neutral and monotonically variance neutral.
C. Weak Unbiasedness
We begin this section by defining the concept of unbiasedness which was introduced
in Bo¨rgers et al. Unbiasedness requires that in all flat environments there is no
expected movement in probability mass.
Definition 11 A learning rule L is said to be unbiased if in all flat environment
f (a) = 0 for each a ∈ A.
The following remark, which is a straightforward consequence of the definitions,
reveals a connection between unbiased learning rules and those that are variance
neutral or monotonically variance neutral. It also generalizes the observation in the
preceding section that the Cross learning rule, which is unbiased, is variance neutral
and monotonically variance neutral.
Remark 2 Every unbiased learning rule is variance neutral and monotonically vari-
ance neutral.
Next we introduce a property related to unbiasedness which we call weak un-
biasedness. This requires that in environments in which all actions have the same
expected payoff and the same variance of payoff there is no expected movement in
probability mass. Lemma 4 below shows why we are interested in weakly unbiased
learning rules.
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Definition 12 A learning rule L is weakly unbiased if in all flat environments with
A = A∗, f (a) = 0 for all a ∈ A.
Lemma 4 Every learning rule that is variance-averse (/neutral/seeking/) or mono-
tonically variance-averse (/neutral/seeking/) is weakly unbiased.
Proof. We first prove this result for variance-averse case in Step 1. The proof
is by contradiction. Suppose the learning rule L is variance-averse and monotoni-
cally variance-averse but that it is not weakly unbiased. Hence, there exist a flat
environment E with A = A∗ and f (a) > 0 for some a ∈ A.
Step 1: We consider two cases:
Case 1: µa ((0, 1)) > 0. Consider another environment E˜ in which action
a removes ε probability uniformly from (0, 1) 8 and assigns (1− pi) ε to 0 and piε
to 1. Other than this difference both environments offer the same distributions of
payoffs for all actions. By construction, the payoff distribution of a in E˜ is a mean
preserving spread of a in E. Let f˜ (a) denote the expected change in probability
on a in environment E˜. Since f˜ (a) is continuous in ε, there is a small enough ε
such that f˜ (a) > 0. This contradicts the assumption that L is variance-averse and
monotonically variance-averse.
Case 2: µa (0, 1) = 0. We break down the argument into three subcases.
Subcase 2.1: µa (1) = 1. Since the environment is flat all actions a
′ ∈ A must
also have µa′ (1) = 1. Consider another environment Eˆ in which each action a ∈ A
assigns probability (1− ε) to 1 and ε to y ∈ (0, 1). Now consider an environment
E˜ in which all actions except a have the same payoff distributions as in Eˆ and
a removes probability ε from y and assigns ε/2 to y − δ and ε/2 to y + δ where
0 < δ < min {1− y, y}. By construction, a in E˜ is a mean preserving spread of
8By which we mean that for every subset D ⊂ (0, 1), µ˜ (D) = (1− ε)µ (D).
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a in Eˆ. As f˜ (a) is continuous in ε there is a small enough ε such that f˜ (a) > 0.
This contradicts the assumption that L is variance-averse and monotonically variance-
averse.
Subcase 2.2: µa (0) = 1. The argument is analogous to Subcase 2.1.
Subcase 2.3: µa (1) 6= 1, µa (0) 6= 1, µa (0)+µa (1) = 1. In this case, pia ∈ (0, 1).
Now consider an environment Eˆ in which each a ∈ A has µˆa (1) = (1− ε)µa (1) and
µˆa (0) = (1− ε)µa (0) and µˆa (pia) = ε. Now consider an environment E˜ in which all
actions except a have the same payoff distributions as in Eˆ and a removes probability
ε from pia and assigns ε/2 to pia+δ and ε/2 to pia−δ for some δ ∈ (0,min {pi, (1− pi)}).
By construction, the distribution of a in E˜ is a mean preserving spread of a in Eˆ.
Since f (a) > 0 by hypothesis, and because f˜ (a) is continuous in ε we have that for
small ε, f˜ (a) > 0. This contradicts the assumption that L is variance-averse and
monotonically variance-averse.
Step 2: The above argument suffices to show that every variance neutral and
monotonically variance neutral rule is weakly unbiased. One simply has to replace
“variance-averse” with “variance neutral” in the above argument.
Step 3: The proof when a learning rule is variance seeking and monotonically
variance seeking is analogous to that provided in Step 1. In this case we begin by
considering a flat environment E with A = A∗ and supposing that f (a) < 0. We
can then construct a new environment E˜ in which all actions a′ 6= a have the same
distribution as in E but action a in E˜ has a distribution which is a mean preserving
spread of the distribution of a in E. Continuity of f function will ensure that for
a small enough change in the the distribution of a in E, we will have f˜ (a) < 0
contradicting that the rule is variance (and monotonically variance) seeking. ¤
The next result characterizes the set of weakly unbiased learning rules.
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Proposition 4 A learning rule is weakly unbiased if and only if there exist matrices
(Aaa′)a,a′=1,...,|A|, (Baa′)a,a′=1,...,|A| and (Caa′)a,a′=1,...,|A| such that for every (a, x) ∈ A×
[0, 1]
L(a,x) (a) = σa + (1− σa)
(
Aaa +Baax− Caax2
)
(3.5)
L(a,x) (a
′) = σa′ − σa′
(
Aaa′ +Baa′x− Caa′x2
) ∀a′ 6= a (3.6)
and for all a,
Aaa = Σa′σa′Aa′a (3.7)
Baa = Σa′σa′Ba′a (3.8)
Caa = Σa′σa′Ca′a (3.9)
Proof.
Sufficiency
Consider a flat environment E with A = A∗ and suppose the learning rule sat-
isfying the properties stated in Proposition 4. Then (3.5)− (3.6) imply that, for all
a,
f (a) = σa
∫ 1
0
(1− σa)
(
Aaa +Baax− Caax2
)
dµa (3.10)
−
∑
a′ 6=a
σa′
∫ 1
0
σa
(
Aa′a +Ba′ax− Ca′ax2
)
dµa′ (3.11)
= σa
[
Aaa +Baapia − Caaξa −
∑
a′
σa′ (Aa′a +Ba′apia′ − Ca′aξa′)
]
.(3.12)
Equations (3.7)− (3.9) and the fact that A = A∗ = A∗ imply f (a) = 0 for all a.
Necessity :
Let L be a weakly unbiased learning rule and let E and E˜ be two flat environ-
ments with A = A∗. Furthermore, suppose the variance of payoff ρ is strictly between
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the minimum ρmin and maximum ρmax possible. The distribution for all actions a in
E is given by (0, x, pia, 1;µa (0) , µa (x) , µa (pia) , µa (a)).
9 In environment E˜ all actions
a′ 6= a have the same distribution as in E, while action a has a distribution given by
(0, pi, 1; µ˜a (0) , µ˜a (pi) , µ˜a (1)). By assumption, p˜ia = pia and ρ˜a = ρa.
To see that for any mean pi, the variance ρ (with ρmin < ρ < ρmax) can be
achieved by a suitably chosen distribution with support on the payoffs 0, pi and 1, we
need to observe that the probabilities µ˜a (0) , µ˜a (pi), and µ˜a (1) have to satisfy the
three equations µ˜a (0) + µ˜a (pi) + µ˜a (1) = 1, µ˜a (0) .0 + µ˜a (pi) .pi + µ˜a (1) .1 = pi and
µ˜a (0) .0
2 + µ˜a (pi) .pi
2 + µ˜a (1) .1
2 = ξ. These three equations can be solved to give,
µ˜a (0) =
ξ − pi2
pi
(3.13)
µ˜a (pi) =
pi − ξ
pi − pi2 (3.14)
µ˜a (1) =
ξ − pi2
1− pi , (3.15)
which have a unique interior solution between 0 and 1 given ρmin < ρ < ρmax.
Next we solve the three equations µa (0)+µa (x)+µa (pi)+µa (1) = 1, µa (0) 0+
µa (x)x + µa (pi)pi + µa (1) 1 = pi and µa (0) 0
2 + µa (x) x
2 + µa (pi)pi
2 + µa (1) 1
2 = ξ
in terms of µa (x) to obtain
µa (0) =
ξ − pi2
pi
− µa (x)
(
1− x− x
2
pi − pi2 −
pix2 − pi2x
pi − pi2
)
(3.16)
µa (pi) =
pi − ξ
pi − pi2 − µa (x)
x− x2
pi − pi2 (3.17)
µa (1) =
ξ − pi2
1− pi − µa (x)
pix2 − pi2x
pi − pi2 . (3.18)
9The first four terms in the brackets are payoffs and the last four terms are their
respective probabilities.
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Substituting (3.13) in (3.16), (3.14) in (3.17) and (3.15) in (3.18) we get,
µa (0) = µ˜a (0)− µa (x)
(
1− x− x
2
pi − pi2 −
pix2 − pi2x
pi − pi2
)
(3.19)
µa (pi) = µ˜a (pi)− µa (x) x− x
2
pi − pi2 (3.20)
µa (1) = µ˜a (1)− µa (x) pix
2 − pi2x
pi − pi2 . (3.21)
Let L¯(a,.) (a
′) denote the expected value of σa′ tomorrow given that a was chosen
today. That is, L¯(a,.) (a
′) =
∫ 1
0
L(a,x) (a
′) dµa. We now compute the expected change
in the probability of an arbitrary action a′ in the two environments,
f (a′) = σa
[
µa (0)L(a,0) (a
′) + µa (x)L(a,x) (a′) + µa (pi)L(a,pi) (a′)
+µa (1)L(a,1) (a
′) + Σa′′ 6=aσa′′L¯(a′′,.) (a′)− σa′ = 0
(3.22)
f˜ (a′) = σa
[
µ˜a (0)L(a,0) (a
′) + µ˜a (pi)L(a,pi) (a′) + µ˜a (1)L(a,1) (a′)
]
+Σa′′ 6=aσa′′L¯(a′′,.) (a′)− σa′ = 0.
(3.23)
Subtracting these two equations and slightly rearranging we get,
µa (x)L(a,x) (a
′) = [µ˜a (0)− µa (0)]L(a,0) (a′)
+ [µ˜a (pi)− µa (pi)]L(a,pi) (a′) (3.24)
+ [µ˜a (1)− µa (1)]L(a,1) (a′)
Substituting (3.19)− (3.21) in (3.24) and slightly re-arranging we obtain,
L(a,x) (a
′) =
[
1− x− x
2
pi − pi2 −
pix2 − pi2x
pi − pi2
]
L(a,0) (a
′)
+
x− x2
pi − pi2L(a,pi) (a
′) (3.25)
+
pix2 − pi2x
pi − pi2 L(a,1) (a
′) ,
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which is a polynomial of order no greater than two in x. Hence, L(a,x) (a
′) can be
written as
L(a,x) (a
′) = Aˆaa′ + Bˆaa′x+ Cˆaa′x2. (3.26)
Straightforward algebra reveals that these conditions impose no extra restrictions
on Aˆaa′ , Bˆaa′ , Cˆaa′ beyond Aˆaa′ = L(a,0) (a
′). In particular, these coefficients do not
depend on pi.
Equating,
L(a,x) (a) = Aˆaa + Bˆaax+ Cˆaax
2 (3.27)
with (3.5), we set the coefficients of Aaa, Baa and Caa in such a way that they satisfy
Aˆaa = σa + (1− σa)Aaa
Bˆaa = (1− σa)Baa
Cˆaa = − (1− σa)Caa.
Similarly, we set the coefficients of Aaa′ , Baa′ and Caa′ in such a way that they satisfy
Aˆa′a = σa − σaAa′a
Bˆa′a = −σaBa′a
Cˆa′a = σaCa′a.
Finally, to prove the necessity of conditions (3.7)−(3.9) consider an environment
in which every action pays x with probability 1. In this environment
f(a) = σa
[(
Aaa +Baax+ Caax
2
)−∑
a′
σa′
(
Aa′a +Ba′ax− Ca′ax2
)]
. (3.28)
This expression has to be zero for all x ∈ [0, 1]. This requires that conditions
(3.7)− (3.9) are satisfied. ¤
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Conditions (3.5) and (3.6) of Proposition 1 reveal that all weakly unbiased rules
apply Cross’ rule after transforming payoffs by a polynomial of order two in which
the coefficients of the transformation are allowed to depend on the chosen action and
the action whose probability is being updated. Conditions (3.7)-(3.9) restrict the
coefficients of this transformation.
Remark 3 The set of unbiased learning rules identified by Bo¨rgers et al. is contained
in the set of weakly unbiased learning rules. They are obtained by setting Ca′a = 0
for all a, a′ ∈ A.
Remark 4 The expected change in probability for an action a for all weakly unbiased
learning rules is given by
f (a) = σa
∑
a′
σa′ [Ba′a (pia − pia′)− Ca′a (ξa − ξa′)] . (3.29)
which in a flat environment reduces to
f (a) = σa
∑
a′
σa′Ca′a (ξa′ − ξa) . (3.30)
As Remark 4 shows, the coefficients Ca′a play a fundamental role in determining
the expected movement of probability in flat sets. The precise relation between
these coefficients and attitudes towards variance of learning rules is studied in the
next section.
D. Learning and Behavior Toward Variance
The next Lemma provides restrictions on the Caa coefficients for a learning rule
to be variance-averse (/neutral/seeking/) or monotonically variance-averse (/neu-
tral/seeking/).
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Lemma 5 Every variance-averse (/neutral/seeking/) learning rule and every mono-
tonically variance-averse (/neutral/seeking/) learning rule has Caa > (/ = / < /) 0.
Proof. Consider a flat environment in which µa (x) = 1 for some x ∈ (0, 1), and all
other actions a′ 6= a have µa′ (x) = 1− ε, and µa′ (x− δ) = ε/2 and µa′ (x+ δ) = ε/2
(for 0 < δ < min {x, 1− x}). Clearly, ξa = x2 and ξa′ = x2 + εδ2 and A∗ = {a}.
Furthermore,
f (a) = σa
[∑
a′ 6=a
σa′Ca′a (ξa′ − ξa)
]
(3.31)
= σa
[∑
a′ 6=a
σa′Ca′aεδ
2
]
(3.32)
= σa (1− σa)Caaεδ2. (3.33)
Hence, for a learning rule to be variance-averse (/neutral/seeking) or monotonically
variance-averse (/neutral/seeking) we require Caa > (/ = / < /) 0. ¤
From Lemma 2 it follows that no variance-averse or monotonically variance-
averse learning rule is Bo¨rgers et al. monotone because such learning rules cannot be
Bo¨rgers et al. unbiased (see Remark 3).
Proposition 5 A learning rule is monotonically variance-averse (/neutral/seeking/)
if and only if
1. Ca′a ≥ (/ = / ≤ /) 0 for all a′ 6= a,
2. if D is a non-empty proper subset of A then there are actions a ∈ D and
a′ ∈ A−D such that Ca′a > (/ = / < /) 0.
Proof. Sufficiency :
From Lemma 4 and Proposition 4 we know that every monotonically variance-
averse (/neutral/seeking/) learning rule has to satisfy equations (3.5)− (3.9). (3.5)
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and (3.6) imply
f (a) = σa
∫ 1
0
(1− σa)
(
Aaa +Baax− Caax2
)
dµa (3.34)
−
∑
a′ 6=a
σa′
∫ 1
0
σa
(
Aa′a +Ba′ax− Ca′ax2
)
dµa′ (3.35)
= σa
[
(Aaa +Baapia − Caaξa)−
∑
a′
σa′ (Aa′a +Ba′apia′ − Ca′aξa′)
]
.(3.36)
Since the environment is flat, and using (3.7)− (3.9), we get
f (a) = σa
[∑
a′
σa′Ca′a (ξa′ − ξa)
]
. (3.37)
Since ξa′ − ξa > 0 for every pair of actions a ∈ A∗ and a′ ∈ A − A∗, f (A∗) > (/ =
/ < /) 0 by the restrictions on C stated in the Proposition.
Necessity :
We focus on the case of variance aversion (the arguments for the other cases are
analogous). The proof is by contradiction. Suppose condition 1 is not satisfied so
that Ca′a < 0 for some a
′ 6= a. Consider a flat environment in which a gives a payoff
of x ∈ (0, 1) with probability one, and a′ gives x with probability 1−ε and x+ δ with
probability ε/2 and gives x − δ with probability ε/2, where δ ∈ (0,min {x, 1− x})
and ε ∈ (0, 1]. All other actions a′′, if any, give a payoff of x ∈ (0, 1) with probability
1 − ε′ and x + δ with probability ε′/2 and gives x − δ with probability ε′/2 where
ε′ ∈ (0, 1]. It is easily seen that ξa = x2, ξa′ = x2+εδ2, ξa′′ = x2+ε′δ2 and A∗ = {a}.
Hence, the conditions on L derived in Proposition 4 imply that
f (a) = σa
{
σaCa′a (ξa′ − ξa) +
∑
a′′ 6=a,a′
σa′′Ca′′a (ξa′′ − ξa)
}
(3.38)
= σa
{
σaCa′aεδ
2 +
∑
a′′ 6=a,a′
σa′′Ca′′aε
′δ2
}
. (3.39)
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For ε′ small enough f (a) = f (A∗) < 0 which contradicts monotonicity. Therefore,
Ca′a cannot be less than zero for any a, a
′ with a 6= a′
Next, suppose condition 2 is not satisfied. Then there exists a non-empty subset
of D ⊂ A, such that A − D 6= ∅ and Ca′a = 0 for all pairs of lotteries a ∈ D and
a′ ∈ A−D. Now consider an environment in which a ∈ D receives a payoff of x with
probability 1 and each action a′ ∈ A−D receives x with probability 1−ε and receives
x − δ with probability ε/2 and receives x + δ with probability ε/2 where ε ∈ (0, 1]
and δ ∈ (0,min {x, 1− x}). Clearly, A∗ = D. Also, for any a ∈ D, the restrictions
of Proposition 1 imply
f (a) = σa
∑
a′∈A−D
σa′Ca′a (ξa′ − ξa) . (3.40)
The RHS vanishes because of our assumption that Ca′a = 0 for all actions a
′ ∈ A−D
and a ∈ D. Therefore, f (a) = f (A∗) = 0 which contradicts the hypothesis that the
rule is monotonically variance-averse. ¤
Our next result shows that every learning rule that is monotonically variance-
averse (/neutral/seeking/) is variance-averse (/neutral/seeking/).
Proposition 6 Every monotonically variance-averse (/neutral/seeking/) learning rule
is variance-averse (/neutral/seeking).
Proof. The proof is analogous to the one provided in Bo¨rgers et al. for their Propo-
sition 3(ii). In our case, we have to perform the induction on the second moments
rather than on the first moments. We omit the details. ¤
It is easy to see that monotone variance-averse rules are a very special case of the
monotonically risk-averse rules introduced in Chapter II. This specific class is the one
in which the response towards the risk of a distribution is completely determined by
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the response toward its variance.10 The relationship between monotonically variance-
averse rules and the monotonically risk-averse learning rules studied in Chapter II is
analogous to the relation between quadratic utility functions and risk-averse utility
functions in expected utility theory (Meyer [24]).
The next example motivates us to consider learning rules that respond in desir-
able ways to both higher mean and lower variance.
Example 2 Negative Cross-Square Learning Rule
L(a,x) (a) = σa + (1− σa)
(
1− x2) (3.41)
L(a,x) (a
′) = σa′ − σa′
(
1− x2) ∀a′ 6= a. (3.42)
The negative Cross-Square rule has Aa′a = Ca′a = 1 and Ba′a = 0 for all a, a
′ ∈ A.
Hence, this learning rule is variance-averse and monotonically variance-averse. Note,
however, that the higher the payoff obtained the more probability mass that is taken
away from the chosen action. This has the consequence that this rule may not have
desirable properties on non-flat sets. In particular, it is not difficult to construct an
example in which each action gives a unique payoff (with probability one) and the
action with the highest payoff has a negative expected movement.
E. Monotonically Mean-Variance-Averse Rules
In environments that are not necessarily flat, we now define the most desirable set
of actions for an agent who prefers higher means and lower variances. Specifically,
we now consider A∗∗ = {a : pia ≥ pia′ ∧ ρa ≤ ρa′ for all a′ ∈ A} which defines the
10From Remark 4 it follows that in flat environments f (a) =
σa
∑
a′ σa′Ca′a (ρa′ − ρa). So, only the variance matters in determining expected
movement.
45
set of actions that have the maximum expected payoff and the minimum variance of
payoff.
Definition 13 A learning rule is monotonically mean-variance-averse if f (A∗∗) > 0
in all environments with A∗∗ 6= A and A∗∗ 6= ∅.
It is easy to see that every monotonically mean-variance-averse learning rule
is monotonically variance-averse. Hence, every monotonically mean-variance-averse
learning rule satisfies the conditions we derived on monotonically variance-averse
rules. The next Proposition provides the necessary and sufficient conditions for a
learning rule to be monotonically mean-variance-averse. As will be seen this provides
some additional restrictions on the relative magnitudes of the B and C coefficients.
Proposition 7 A learning rule is monotonically mean-variance-averse if and only if
1. The learning rule is monotonically variance-averse.
2. Ba′a − 2Ca′ax ≥ 0 for all x ∈ (0, 1) and for all a, a′ ∈ A.
3. If D is a nonempty subset of A, then for all x ∈ (0, 1) there exists an action
a ∈ D and an action a′ ∈ A−D such that Ba′a − 2Ca′ax > 0.
Proof. Sufficiency :
Let a ∈ A∗∗. Then,
f (a) = σa
{
(Baapia − Caaξa)−
∑
a′
σa′ (Ba′apia′ − Ca′aξa′)
}
. (3.43)
Conditions 2 and 3 of the hypothesis and conditions 1 and 2 in Proposition 5 ensure
that at least one of the terms is strictly positive for some a ∈ A∗∗.
Necessity :
The necessity of condition 1 in this Proposition is obvious. To see that condition
2 is necessary suppose by way of contradiction that Ba′a−2Ca′ax < 0 for some a′ 6= a
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and some x ∈ (0, 1). Consider an environment in which µa (x) = 1 so that pia = x and
ρa = 0 for some x ∈ (0, 1). Furthermore, suppose that µa′ (x− δ) = 1 for δ ∈ (0, x)
so that pia′ = x − δ and ρa′ = 0 for some x ∈ (0, 1). Lastly, suppose that for any
a′′ we have µa′′ (x− ε) = 1 for ε ∈ (0, x) so that pia′′ = x − ε and ρa′′ = 0 for some
x ∈ (0, 1). Clearly, in this environment A∗∗ = {a} 6= A. We have
f (a) = σa
{∑
a′
σa′
[(
Ba′apia − Ca′api2a
)− (Ba′apia′ − Ca′api2a′)]
}
(3.44)
= σa{σa′
[(
Ba′ax− Ca′ax2
)− (Ba′a (x− δ)− Ca′a (x− δ)2)] (3.45)
+
∑
a′′
σa′′
[(
Ba′′ax− Ca′′ax2
)− (Ba′′a (x− ε)− Ca′′a (x− ε)2)]}(3.46)
For small enough δ the first term in the first square bracket is negative. Hence,
for small enough ε, we have f (a) < 0 which contradicts the learning rule being
monotonically mean-variance-averse.
Finally, to prove the necessity of condition 3, suppose by way of contradiction that
for some x ∈ (0, 1) we have Ba′a− 2Ca′ax = 0 for all a, a′ with a ∈ D and a′ ∈ A−D.
We know from the necessity of condition 2 of Proposition 2 that Ca′a > 0 for some
a ∈ D and a′ ∈ A − D. This implies that there exists an x′ ∈ (x, 1) such that
Ba′a − 2Ca′ax < 0 which violates condition 2 and therefore violates mean-variance
aversion. ¤
Monotone mean-variance-averse rules have several useful properties. The next
result reveals that such rules are expected to result in behavior that reduces variance
in flat sets. In environments in which all actions have the same variance such rules
tend to increase expected payoffs.
Proposition 8 Suppose L is a monotonically mean-variance-averse rule. Then:
1. In every flat set with A∗∗ 6= A, we have h < 0.
2. In every set with ρa = ρa′ for all a, a
′ ∈ A and A∗∗ 6= A, we have g > 0.
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Proof. The argument follows from an inductive argument similar to that provided
in Proposition 3(ii) in Bo¨rgers et al. We omit the details. ¤
We end this section with an example of a learning rule that is monotonically
mean-variance-averse.
Example 3 Mean-Variance Cross Learning rule
L(a,x) (a) = σa + (1− σa)
(
x− 1
2
x2
)
(3.47)
L(a,x) (a
′) = σa′ − σa′
(
x− 1
2
x2
)
∀a′ 6= a. (3.48)
Comparing Example 2 with Example 3 we see that in the Mean-Variance Cross
learning rule the updated probability of the chosen action responds positively to the
obtained payoff whereas in the Negative Cross learning rule this response is negative.
Intuitively, this difference allows the Mean-Variance Cross learning rule to respond
positively to the expected payoff of the chosen action.
F. Conclusion
In the class of learning rules in which people learn from their experience, we have
characterized those that would be expected to lead them to choose actions with higher
means and lower variances. Our analysis has been both short run and “local,” in the
sense that the current behavior of the agent is taken as given. Future work could
extend our local analysis to a “global” one. Such an extension should allow us to
study the long run behavior of learning rules with differing risk attitudes.
From the characterization of monotonically mean-variance-averse rules we see
that concerns for variance must pay some cost in terms of expected payoffs. This is
because such rules cannot be in the class of rules studied by Bo¨rgers et al. Conse-
quently, there must exist environments in which the concern for variance leads to no
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improvement in terms of means. That a concern for variance impedes responsiveness
to expected payoffs has been observed in experiments.
How exactly does learning respond to mean and variance? Existing research
accounts for several psychological attitudes in the learning rule, though none seem
to have explicitly taken into account the responsiveness of learning to mean and
variance (see, e.g., Camerer and Ho [7]). Future work could attempt to more precisely
determine how the learning rules people actually use respond to the mean and the
variance of a distribution. Our characterization of monotonically mean-variance-
averse learning rules should prove useful for this enterprise.
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CHAPTER IV
MONOTONE IMITATION
A. Introduction
People often learn from their own experiences and by observing the experiences of
others. As decision makers, we compare the performance of our decisions with the
performance of the actions selected by other people. Actions leading to better results
are more likely to be played in the future when the same problem is faced again. In
this essay we find conditions, for this manner of learning, under which the number of
individuals who play the actions with the best payoff distribution available is expected
to increase. This requires the social learning process to exhibit three basic features.
First, the action each individual plays in the next period is either the action she
played in the current period or an action played by other individual she observed.
Second, the higher the payoff provided by an action, the more likely this action is
to be played in the next period. Third, all the actions are treated in a pair wise
symmetric way.
We analyze of a finite population of individuals facing the same multi-armed
bandit repeatedly. The information context we analyze corresponds to the one in-
troduced by Schlag [33]: every period each member of the population (she) has to
choose one action out of a fixed set that is common to the entire population. The
decision makers do not know the payoff distributions of these actions; the only infor-
mation available to each of them is the action that she played last period, the action
played by some other member of the population (he), and the corresponding payoffs.
This information determines the probability with which the individual will play each
action in the next period. The function mapping the available information to the
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probability of choosing each action is what we call an imitation rule, or, simply, the
rule.
We study how the imitation rule used by the individuals determines whether a
greater fraction of the population will, in the future, choose actions that are more
likely to give higher payoffs. An imitation rule is said to be first-order monotone
(FOM) if the fraction of the population who plays the actions whose distributions are
first-order stochastically dominant is expected to increase. This is required for every
possible set of probability distributions associated to the different actions.
The motivation for studying FOM rules is related to the way we interpret the
payoffs of this model. In multi-armed bandits applied to economic analysis, typically
payoffs are interpreted as units of money. For example, in Rothschild [30], payoffs
represent the profits of a store trying to price an item in its inventory; and in the recent
experiments of Apesteguia, Huck and Oechssler [1], payoffs correspond to the profits of
oligopolistic firms playing a Cournot game. When payoffs are interpreted as monetary
units, our focus on rules that lead to play actions with first-order stochastic dominant
payoff distributions is consistent with the developments in the theory of rational
choice under risk (Expected Utility Theory) with regards to stochastic dominance.1
In Expected Utility Theory (EUT), decision makers with increasing Bernoulli utility
functions prefer first-order stochastically dominant distributions. However, they do
not always prefer payoff distributions with the highest expected value. An alternative
approach would be focusing on imitation rules that lead to expected payoff maximizing
actions. From the analysis we provide below, it is not difficult to see that such an
approach would lead to virtually the same set of improving rules characterized by
Schlag [33]. This is the set of rules for which the average payoff of the population is
1See, for example, Hanoch and Levy [19].
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expected to increase in every environment. Using Schlag’s [33] characterization for
improving rules and the characterization of FOM rules we provide here, it is easy to
see that every (non trivial) improving rule is FOM. In EUT, the class of Bernoulli
functions consistent with first-order stochastic dominance contains all the Bernoulli
functions that are increasing, not only those that are linear. In the same way, FOM
rules do not need to be linear in payoffs as the set of improving rules. In other words,
our definition of FOM rules allows for a wider range of specifications because it is
based on the notion of first-order stochastic dominance and not in expected values.
Our contribution is closely related to the line of research outlined in Bo¨rgers
(1996). We relate a model of social learning to rational choice: we find the rules that
lead a population facing repeatedly a multi-armed bandit to choose the actions that
would be chosen by rational decision makers if the payoff distributions associated to
the actions were known. Bo¨rgers (1996) suggests that a main role of learning and
evolution theory in economics should be providing a theoretical framework to asses
when experience will lead individuals to behave as rational agents. We derive the
precise characteristics that a social learning process has to satisfy in order to lead the
population to choose the actions which fully-informed rational agents would choose.
Consistence of decisions with the order defined by first-order stochatic dominance
may be regarded as one of the most elemental characteristics of rational choice. Fur-
thermore, our results reveal that very simple and rather natural rules may display
this property.2
Alternatively, payoffs may be (more generally) interpreted as a numerical rep-
resentation of a preference order over outcomes associated to the played actions. A
sufficient condition for this representation is that preferences over outcomes induce
2The concept of first-order monotonicity may also be motivated by evolutionary
considerations. See the discussion in Section H.
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a linear order over this set and that the cardinality of the set of outcomes is smaller
than the cardinality of the set of payoffs in the analysis.3 Under this interpretation
FOM rules are those leading individuals to choose actions that are more likely to
provide preferred outcomes.
After introducing the framework in Section B, in Section C we provide two char-
acterizations for FOM rules. The first characterization reveals that a necessary con-
dition for first-order monotonicity is that the imitation rule must be imitative. An
imitation rule is called imitative if each individual plays either the action that she
played in the previous period or the action played by the individual she observed. Fur-
thermore, this characterization shows that when the payoff distribution of one action
strictly first-order stochastically dominates the payoff distribution of the other, then
when two individuals playing each of these actions sample each other, the probability
that the individual playing the dominated action switches to the dominant action is
higher than the probability that the individual playing the dominant action switches
to the dominated action. The analysis also reveals that this condition requires the
imitation rule to be impartial. An imitation rule is called impartial if, when all the
distributions of payoffs associated to the different actions are the same, the proportion
of individuals who choose each action is expected to remain the same.
In the second characterization we describe FOM rules in terms of their functional
form. In particular, besides being imitative, FOM rules can be described in terms
of what we call the net-switching functions of an imitation rule. For each pair of
actions a and a′, we define the net-switching function from a to a′. This is the
difference between the probability of playing a′ in the next period by an individual
3In other words, if it is possible to define an injective function from the set of
outcomes to the set of payoffs. If a preference order is indifferent over two or more
different outcomes, to obtain a linear order, the set of outcomes can be redefined in
such a way that these outcomes are the same.
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who played a in this period and observed another individual who played a′, and the
probability of playing action a in the next period by an individual who played a′ in
this period and observed another individual who played a, when the payoff obtained
from each action in both cases is the same. The arguments of this function are the
payoffs obtained from playing each action. This characterization reveals that the
net-switching functions are symmetric in the obtained payoffs in the sense that if
the payoff obtained with action a is substituted for the payoff obtained with action
a′ and vice versa, then only the sign of the net-switching function changes. The
magnitude remains the same. From the proof of this result it is easy to see that
this feature is derived from the impartial property. Furthermore we prove that the
net-switching function from a to a′ is increasing in the payoff obtained with action a′.
Likewise, and as a consequence of the symmetry described above, the net-switching
function is decreasing in the payoff obtained with action a. Finally, we show that
the net-switching functions are strictly positive if the payoff of the action to which
the probability is being switched is strictly greater than the payoff of the action from
which the probability is being switched. However, the net-switching functions do not
need to be strictly increasing in the payoff of the action that receives the probability.
In Section D we study the dynamics of optimal choice in large populations. We
show that if decision makers use a FOM rule, then it is very likely that an arbitrarily
large fraction of the population will play an optimal action after a finite number of
periods.
In Section E we discuss a number of examples in the literature that satisfy the
properties we described above. It is easy to show that the rule Imitate if Better and
Schlag’s [33] Proportional Imitation Rule are FOM. As suggested by its name, the rule
Imitate if Better prescribes switching (with probability one) to the observed action
only if the payoff of that action is higher. Instead, the Proportional Imitation Rule
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prescribes switching to the observed action only if the payoff of that action is higher
and with a probability proportional to the difference in the payoffs. We also show
that no FOM imitation rule can be said to be dominant in the sense that for all of
them we can find a set of distributions for the payoffs such that, in that set, another
FOM imitation rule has a greater expected increase in the fraction of the population
playing an optimal action. Section F describes the analysis of properties founded in
criteria related to performance at the individual level. Section G explains how to
introduce risk aversion criteria in the analysis of social learning. Finally, Section H
discusses alternative directions for further research.
Learning in social contexts has recently received a great deal of attention in
economics. The work of Ellison and Fudenberg [14], [15] shows how simple imitation
rules can lead a population to play the optimal action in the long run. Schlag [33] and
Morales [25] proceed in the opposite direction. They propose a number of properties
that are desirable for an imitation rule, in terms of their performance, and identify
the imitation rules satisfying those properties. Our work is also in this direction, but
in contrast to them, this essay focuses on properties of performance based on the
concept of stochastic dominance rather than the expected value of the payoffs.
Another information context is considered in Schlag [33]. He analyzes a model
similar to the one analyzed here, but the decision maker is able to observe the actions
and obtained payoffs of two other individuals of the population, instead of only one.
Schlag [34] identifies imitation rules that lead an infinite population to the expected
payoff maximizing action. In Morales [25] the decision maker observes his action and
obtained payoff and the action played by another member of the population and the
corresponding payoff. He is able to identify the imitation rules that are absolutely
expedient, i.e., imitation rules for which the expected payoff of each individual is
expected to increase in every environment. Agents’ information in Morales [25] is the
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same as in the model discussed here. What is distinctive in his setup is the imitative
restriction he imposes. This restriction requires that only the probabilities of the
played and observed actions to be updated while the probabilities of playing all the
other actions remain the same.
Other information settings have been studied in Vega-Redondo [37] and in the
work of Apesteguia et al. [1], in the context of Cournot games. In Vega-Redondo [37],
in every period, and with some positive probability, each firm can revise the action
it has being playing. He assumes that in the next period firms would play any of
the actions that obtained the highest profits in the current period and shows that
the implied dynamics of the system lead firms to Walrasian behavior. Note that such
decision rules imply that each firm is able to find out what are the quantities produced
by the firms who obtained the highest profits in the periods when they revise their
own production levels. Apesteguia et al. provide some experimental results that show
how the imitation patterns of experimental subjects respond to different information
treatments. An important result in their experiments, among many others, is that
the probability of switching to observed actions responds to the magnitude of the
difference in payoffs.
B. Framework
We analyze the behavior of a population described as a set of agents W . For most
of our analysis the size of the population is finite, so |W | < ∞. In every period,
each member of the population has to choose an action a ∈ A, where A is the finite
set of actions available to the decision maker. The chosen action, a, yields a payoff
x ∈ [0, 1]; this payoff is a random variable whose probability measure and distribution
are denoted by µa and Fa, respectively. We will refer to the vector of distributions as
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the environment and we will denote it by F , i.e. F = (Fa)a∈A. We assume that the
payoffs obtained from different actions are pair-wise independent and independent in
time. The fraction of the population that chooses the action a in the current period
is denoted by pa. In what follows, first-order stochastic dominance is abbreviated
by Fa fosd Fa′ and means that Fa(x) ≤ Fa′(x) for all x ∈ [0, 1]; and strict first-
order stochastic dominance, denoted by Fa sfosd Fa′ , means that Fa fosd Fa′ and
Fa(x) < Fa′(x) for at least one element x ∈ [0, 1]. Let A∗ := {a ∈ A : Fa fosd Fa′
∀ a′ ∈ A} and for every set S ⊆ A, let p(S) be the fraction of the population that
chooses, in the current period, an action contained in this set, i.e. p(S) :=
∑
a∈S pa.
Each member of the population is able to observe the action that she chose in
the current period and the payoff she obtains. She is also able to observe the action
chosen in the current period by one of the other members of the population and the
payoff he obtains. At the moment of choosing their actions in the next period this
is all the information the individuals use. Decisions are assumed to be probabilistic,
i.e., we assume that the action each decision maker chooses in the next period is
random. The available information, however, affects the probability with which each
action is chosen. In particular, we assume that the behavior of each individual in the
population can be described by the function L : A× [0, 1]×A× [0, 1]→ ∆(A). This
functions maps each quartet (a, x, a′, y) to a vector L(a, x, a′, y). Here a is the action
chosen by the agent in the current period, x is the payoff she obtains, a′ is the action
chosen by the agent that she observes and y is the payoff he obtains. All of these vari-
ables will determine the vector L(a, x, a′, y) containing the probabilities of choosing
each action in the next period. The element L(a, x, a′, y)a′′ of L(a, x, a′, y) denotes
the probability with which the decision maker will play action a′′ in the next period.
L(a, x, a′, y) must be contained in ∆(A), which is the set of all probability distribu-
tions over A. Accordingly, the vector-valued function L is called the imitation rule of
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the individual. For notational convenience, we assume that all the individuals in the
population use the same rule. However, it is clear form the analysis that, with the
only exception of the results provided in Section D, this assumption is not required.
Note that if we know the imitation rule, the action chosen by the agent and the action
chosen by the agent that she is able to observe, we can compute the expected proba-
bility of playing each action in the next period. Let La
′′
a,a′ be the expected probability,
before the realization of the payoffs, of choosing action a′′ tomorrow by a member
of the population with imitation rule L who played action a and observed another
individual who played action a′, i.e., La
′′
a,a′ :=
∫ ∫
L(a, x, a′, y)a′′dFa(x)dFa′(y).
For each member of the population, the individual that she is able to observe is
determined by a random procedure. Formally, the probability that the agent c ∈ W
observes another agent d ∈W will be denoted by Pr(cd); thus∑d∈W\{c} Pr(cd) = 1 for
all c ∈ W . It is assumed that the sampling process is symmetric, i.e., Pr(cd) = Pr(dc)
for all c, d ∈ W . Without this assumption the analysis rapidly becomes more complex.
Furthermore, we assume that Pr(cd) > 0 for all c, d ∈ W. As we will see in the next
section, this assumption guarantees that any individual playing a non-optimal action
can learn from any other individual playing an optimal action with some positive
probability, and therefore, it allows the fraction of the population playing optimal
actions to increase in expected terms.
The expected fraction of the population that will play action a ∈ A in the next
period, given the choices of the population in the current period, is denoted by p′a.
Let s(c) be the action c ∈ W played in the current period. It is easy to see that p′a
can be computed as
p′a =
1
|W |
∑
c∈W
∑
d∈W\{c}
Pr(cd)Las(c),s(d). (4.1)
58
Likewise, if we denote the expected fraction of the population that will play an action
in A∗ during the next period by p′(A∗), it is easy to see that
p′(A∗) =
∑
a∈A∗
1
|W |
∑
c∈W
∑
d∈W\{c}
Pr(cd)Las(c),s(d). (4.2)
The following definition formalizes one of the main concepts under analysis; it defines
the imitation rules that lead a population to increase the number of its members that
play an optimal action.
Definition 14 A rule L is said to be first-order monotone (FOM) if p′(A∗) ≥ p(A∗),
with strict inequality when p(A∗) ∈ (0, 1), in every environment.
Definition 14 does not impose extra restrictions on the random process that
determines how individuals sample each other. Furthermore, it does not specify
what the proportions of the population playing each action in the current period
are. Therefore p′(A∗) ≥ p(A∗) is required to be satisfied for any environment, any
symmetric sampling procedure where each individual may observe any of the others
with a positive probability, and regardless the actions that are currently being played
by the members of the population. Furthermore, in expected terms, the fraction
of the population playing an optimal action always increases strictly as long as at
least one individual plays an optimal action and at least one individual does not.
Obviously p(A∗) can not increase strictly when it is equal to one. The reason why we
do not impose p(A∗) to increase strictly when p(A∗) = 0 is a little more subtle and
we explain it in the next section.
C. First-Order Monotone Imitation Rules
In this section we provide two characterizations for FOM rules. The first character-
ization reveals that these rules need to satisfy a number of restrictions. The first
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restriction requires that each member of the population will not choose in the next
period any action that is not either the action she chose or the one that was chosen
by the agent she observed. Schlag [33] calls such rules imitative.
Definition 15 A rule L is said to be imitative if for all actions a, a′, a′′ ∈ A, such
that a′′ /∈ {a, a′}, we have L(a, x, a′, y)a′′ = 0 for all x, y ∈ [0, 1].
The following preliminary result describes the expected change in the fraction of
the population who plays action a ∈ A for imitative rules.
Lemma 6 If L is imitative, then
p′a − pa =
1
|W |
∑
c∈W, s(c)6=a
∑
d∈W, s(d)=a
Pr(cd)(Las(c),a − Ls(c)a,s(c)). (4.3)
The expression above is just the difference between the expected fraction of
the population that will switch from an action a′ ∈ A\{a} to action a in the next
period and the expected fraction of the population that will switch from action a to a
different action in the next period. The proof of Lemma 6 follows from straightforward
calculations and the assumption that Pr(cd) = Pr(dc) for all c, d ∈ W .
We also found that every FOM imitation rule is not expected to change the
proportion of the population who chooses each action in all the environments where
the distributions of payoffs associated with each action are the same. We call that
property impartiality.
Definition 16 We say that a rule is impartial if p′a−pa = 0 for all a ∈ A, whenever
Fa(x) = Fa′(x) for all x ∈ [0, 1] for all a′ ∈ A.
We now present a first characterization of FOM rules. This characterization
shows that both imitation and impartiality are necessary conditions for a rule to be
FOM.
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Lemma 7 A rule L is FOM if and only if it satisfies the following conditions:
(i) L is imitative.
(ii) Fa′ sfosd Fa ⇒ La′aa′ − Laa′a > 0, ∀ a, a′ ∈ A for all environments.
Proof.
Sufficiency :
Since L is imitative, Lemma 0 applies. Therefore, for all a ∈ A we have
p′a − pa =
1
|W |
∑
c,d∈W ;s(c)6=a,s(d)=a
Pr(cd)(Las(c),a − Ls(c)a,s(c)). (4.4)
Now, because of (ii), for every a ∈ A∗ and c ∈ W, we have Las(c),a − Ls(c)a,s(c) ≥ 0. It
follows that p′a − pa ≥ 0 for all a ∈ A∗, therefore p′(A∗) ≥ p(A∗). Note that when
p(A∗) ∈ {0, 1} we have that p′(A∗) = p(A∗), because L is imitative. Now consider
p(A∗) ∈ (0, 1). We know that p′a′ − pa′ ≥ 0 for all a′ ∈ A∗. Furthermore, by Lemma 6,
for some a′ ∈ A∗, we have p′a′ − pa′ > 0, because p(A\A∗) > 0, Pr(cd) > 0 for all c,
d ∈ W , and La′a,a′ − Laa′,a > 0 for all a ∈ A\A∗.
Necessity of (i):
Suppose that there are some x, y ∈ [0, 1], a, a′, a′′ ∈ A, a′′ /∈ {a, a′} such that
L(a, x, a′, y)a′′ > 0. Furthermore, suppose pa + pa′ = 1, Fa = Fa′ , µa(x) = µa(y) =
µa(1) = 1/3, and µa′′′(0) = 1 for all a
′′′ ∈ A\{a, a′}.4 It follows that A∗ = {a, a′},
therefore p(A∗) = 1. Suppose that there are c, d ∈ W such that Pr(cd) > 0, s(c) = a,
and s(d) = a′, then p′(A∗) < 1. Thus, L has to be imitative.
Necessity of condition (ii):
Suppose that Fa′ sfosd Fa, but L
a′
aa′−Laa′a ≤ 0, for some a, a′ ∈ A. Suppose that
pa + pa′ = 1, pa < 1, pa′ < 1 and that A
∗ = {a′}. Since L is imitative, Lemma 6
4If x 6= y = 1, then it means that µa(1) = 2/3 and µa(x) = 1/3; if x = y = 1, then
µa(1) = 1; etc. In what follows we adopt this notation convention.
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yields
p′a′ − pa′ =
1
|W |
∑
c,d∈W ;s(c)=a,s(d)=a′
Pr(cd)(La
′
a,a′ − Laa′,a). (4.5)
Assume that s(c) = a and s(d) = a′ for some c, d ∈ W. Then, we have that p(A∗) ∈
(0, 1), but La
′
aa′ − Laa′a ≤ 0 implies p′(A∗) ≤ p(A∗). ¤
Corollary 3 If L is FOM, then Fa′ fosd Fa L
a′
aa′ − Laa′a ≥ 0, ∀ a, a′ ∈ A, for all
environments.
Proof. Suppose that for some a, a′ ∈ A, Fa′ = Fa, but La′aa′ − Laa′a < 0. For
ε ∈ (0, 1) consider the modified environment F˜ such that for any interval I ⊆ [0, 1),
µ˜a′(I) = (1 − ε)µa′(I), µ˜a′(1) = µa′(1) + εµa′ [0, 1); and for any interval I ⊆ (0, 1],
µ˜a(I) = (1−ε)µa(I), µ˜a(0) = µa(0)+εµa(0, 1]. In this modified environment F˜a′ sfosd
F˜a. Since L
a′
a,a′−Laa′,a < 0 in the original environment, and L˜a′a,a′− L˜aa′a can be written
as a continuous function in ε, we obtain that for small enough ε, L˜a
′
aa′ − L˜aa′a < 0.
This is a contradiction because F˜a′ sfosd F˜a. ¤
Remark 5 Note that Corollary 3 implies that if Fa(x) = Fa′(x) for all x ∈ [0, 1],
then La
′
aa′ − Laa′a = 0. From Lemma 6, this implies that every FOM rule is impartial.
As revealed by the proof of Lemma 7, the imitative property of FOM rules
follows from the fact that improvement is required in every environment, regardless
of the fraction of the population that is playing each action in the current period.
In particular, if all the members of the population play an action in A∗, then the
expected fraction of the population that plays an action in A∗ in the next period
will be strictly less than one unless all of them, with probability one, play either the
action they played in the current period or the action played by the other member of
the population they observed. This requires the imitation rule to be imitative. This
condition implies that when no individual in the population is playing an optimal
62
action the population is unable to learn to play actions in A∗. For this reason we
do not impose that p′(A∗) > p(A∗) when p(A∗) = 0. Clearly an imitation rule that
satisfies p′(A∗) > p(A∗) when p(A∗) = 0 and p′(A∗) = p(A∗) when p(A∗) = 1 can not
exist.5
The necessity of properties that are similar to our notion of impartiality has been
found in many places in the literature. From Schlag’s [33] results it follows that, if the
average payoff of the population is expected to increase in every environment, then
the imitation rule of the population must verify that, in every environment where all
the actions have the same expected payoffs, the expected fraction of the population
who plays each action in the next period is the same as today. Similar results for
individual learning have been found by Bo¨rgers et al. and in Chapter II.
The next result provides a characterization of FOM social rules in terms of the
shape of L(a, x, a′, y)a′′ , for all a, a′, a′′ ∈ A. In the analysis below, we will recurrently
use the concept of net-switching function from action a to action a′. We denote this
function by gaa′(x, y) and it is defined as gaa′(x, y) ≡ L(a, x, a′, y)a′ − L(a′, y, a, x)a.
This function measures how much probability is being shifted from action a to action
a′ when two agents playing a and a′ observe each other.
Proposition 9 A rule L is FOM if and only if it satisfies the following conditions:
(i) L is imitative,
(ii) for all a, a′ ∈ A, the net-switching functions gaa′(x, y) satisfy:
(ii.1) gaa′(x, y) = −gaa′(y, x), ∀ x, y ∈ [0, 1],
(ii.2) gaa′(x, y) is non-decreasing in y, for all x ∈ [0, 1].
5Alternatively, for every FOM rule we could allow each individual to experiment
with a small probability. This would imply that p′(A∗) > p(A∗) when p(A∗) = 0.
However, then we would have p′(A∗) < 1 when p(A∗) = 1.Nevertheless, it is clear that,
for any environment, one could have an small enough experimentation probability
such that p′(A∗) > p(A∗) when p(A∗) ∈ (0, 1).
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(ii.3) gaa′(x, y) > 0, ∀ x, y ∈ [0, 1] such that y > x.
In order to prove Proposition 9, we need the following lemma.
Lemma 8 Consider a function g : [0, 1]2 → [−1, 1] that satisfies:
(i) g(x, y) = −g(y, x), ∀ x, y ∈ [0, 1],
(ii) g(x, y) is non-decreasing in y, for all x ∈ [0, 1],
(iii) g(x, y) > 0, ∀ x, y ∈ [0, 1] such that y > x.
Then, for any two independent random variables X and Y, such that Y sfosd X,
we have that E(g(X, Y )) > 0.
Proof. The proof proceeds in two steps:
Step 1: We first prove that Y sfosd X implies P (Y > X) > P (Y < X). Let
M := {z ∈ [0, 1] : FX(z) > FY (z)} denote the set of all points in [0, 1] where the
distribution function of X is strictly larger than the distribution function of Y . M is
non-empty since Y sfosd X. We show PX(M) > 0, where PX is the measure induced
by X. If 0 ∈ M then PX(M) ≥ FX(0) > 0. So, without loss of generality we will
assume 0 /∈ M . Let z˜ ∈ M . Define z0 := sup{z : z ≤ z˜, FX(z) = FY (z)} ≥ 0. If
z0 ∈M , then lim
z→z0−
FX(z) = lim
z→z0−
FY (z) because of the definition of z0 and
PX(M) ≥ P (X = z0)
= FX(z0)− lim
z→z0−
FX(z)
= FX(z0)− lim
z→z0−
FY (z)
≥ FX(z0)− FY (z0)
> 0.
(4.6)
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If z0 /∈M , then FX(z) > FY (z) for all z ∈ (z0, z˜] =: N and
PX(M) ≥ PX(N)
= FX(z˜)− FX(z0)
= FX(z˜)− FY (z0)
≥ FX(z˜)− FY (z˜)
> 0.
(4.7)
We define now h(a, b) := 1{b>a} and 4h(a, b) := h(a, b) − h(b, a). For all a ∈ M , we
have the inequality
E(4h(a, Y )) = 1− FY (a)− FY (a−)
> 1− FX(a)− FX(a−)
= E(4h(a,X)).
(4.8)
The inequality holds weakly for a /∈ M. Let X˜ =d X be a random variable which is
independent from X and Y . Then we get
E(4h(X, Y )) = E(E(4h(X, Y )|X))
> E(E(4h(X, X˜)|X))
= E(4h(X, X˜))
= 0
(4.9)
and therefore, using the definition of 4h, we obtain P (Y > X) > P (Y < X).
Step 2: Because of the monotonicity of the probability measure P , there exists
² > 0 such that P (Y −X > ²) > P (X > Y ). LetD := {(x, y) : x, y ∈ [0, 1], y−x > ²}.
Now, we prove that
c := inf{g(x, y) : x, y ∈ D} > 0. (4.10)
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Let k := inf{n ∈ N : n > 2/²} and Ii := [0, i−1k ] × [ ik ,1] for all i ∈ {2, ..., k − 1}. It
is easy to see that D ⊂ ⋃k−1i=2 Ii. Then ci := inf{g(x, y) : x, y ∈ Ii} = g( i−1k , ik ) > 0
for all i ∈ {2, ..., k − 1} because of the monotonicity of g and assumption (iii). Then
c ≥ min{ci : i ∈ {2, ..., k − 1}} > 0.
Let
g1(x, y) := (g(x, y)− c) · 1{g(x,y)≥c} + (g(x, y) + c) · 1{g(x,y)≤−c}, (4.11)
and
g2(x, y) := c · (1{g(x,y)≥c} − 1{g(x,y)≤−c}) + g(x, y) · 1{−c<g(x,y)<c}. (4.12)
We have g(x, y) = g1(x, y)+ g2(x, y) where g1, g2 satisfy conditions (i) and (ii) of the
hypothesis. It follows that E(g1(X, Y )) ≥ 0 because
E(g1(X, Y )) =
∫ ∫
g1(x, y)dFY (y)dFX(x)
≥ ∫ ∫ g1(x, y)dFX(y)dFX(x)
≥ ∫ ∫ g1(x, y)dFY (x)dFX(y)
= − ∫ ∫ g1(y, x)dFY (x)dFX(y)
= −E(g1(X, Y )),
(4.13)
where we have used the independence of X and Y and the fact that g1(x, y) is non-
decreasing in the second argument and non-increasing in the first argument. On D,
we have g2(x, y) = c and on C := {(x, y) : x > y}, we have g2(x, y) ≥ −c. Thus, we
get
E(g2(X, Y )) ≥ c · P (D)− c · P (C) > 0. (4.14)
Summarized, we have E(g(X,Y )) > 0. ¤
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Proof of Proposition 9.
Necessity of (ii.1 ):
We start by proving that gaa′(x, x) = 0 for all x ∈ [0, 1] and all a, a′ ∈ A.
Consider an arbitrary x ∈ [0, 1] and an environment where µa(x) = µa′(x) = 1.
Notice that Fa = Fa′ . Therefore, by Remark 5, L
a′
aa′−Laa′a = 0. But in this environment
La
′
aa′ − Laa′a = gaa′(x, x). It follows that gaa′(x, x) = 0.
Now, for any x, y ∈ [0, 1] and some a, a′ ∈ A, consider an environment where
µa(x) = µa′(x) = µa(y) = µa′(y) = 1/2, and notice that Fa = Fa′ . By Remark 5,
0 = La
′
aa′ − Laa′a
= 1
4
(gaa′(x, y) + gaa′(y, x) + gaa′(x, x) + gaa′(y, y))
= 1
4
(gaa′(x, y) + gaa′(y, x)).
(4.15)
Therefore, gaa′(x, y) = −gaa′(y, x).
Necessity of (ii.2):
Suppose that for some a, a′ ∈ A and x, y′, y ∈ [0, 1] such that y′ > y, we have that
gaa′(x, y
′) < gaa′(x, y). Consider an environment such that µa(x) = µa′(x) = 1 − ε,
µa(y) = µa′(y
′) = ε, and notice that Fa′ sfosd Fa. It follows that
0 < La
′
aa′ − Laa′a
= (1− ε)εgaa′(x, y′) + (1− ε)εgaa′(y, x) + (1− ε)2gaa′(x, x) + ε2gaa′(y, y′)
= ε[(1− ε){gaa′(x, y′)− gaa′(x, y)}+ εgaa′(y, y′)].
(4.16)
The last equality holds because of the necessity of (ii.1). The term inside the brackets
{.} is negative. Thus, for small enough ε, the term inside the brackets [.] is negative,
causing a contradiction.
Necessity of (ii.3):
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Suppose that y > x and gaa′(x, y) ≤ 0. Consider a, a′ ∈ A such that µa(x) =
µa′(y) = 1. Clearly Fa′ sfosd Fa, but L
a′
aa′ − Laa′a = gaa′(x, y) ≤ 0, which violates
condition (ii) of Lemma 7.
Sufficiency :
Sufficiency follows directly from Lemma 8. ¤
Proposition 9 reveals the properties of the functional form of FOM imitation
rules that we described in the Introduction. Besides being imitative, these rules treat
every pair of actions in a pair wise symmetric way (condition (ii.1)). Furthermore,
net-switching from action a to action a′ must be a non-decreasing function of the
payoff of action a′ (condition (ii.2)), and strictly positive if the payoff of a′ is greater
than the payoff of a (condition (ii.3)). This result allows us to check, directly from
the functional form of an imitation rule, whether it is FOM or not. In Section E we
analyze a number of imitation rules from the literature and use Proposition 9 to asses
whether they are FOM.
The following corollary follows directly from conditions (ii.1 ) and (ii.2 ) in Propo-
sition 9.
Corollary 4 If L is FOM then gaa′(x, y) is non-increasing in x, for all y ∈ [0, 1].
In our definition of A∗, all the distributions in this set are the same. This can be
slightly generalized. If A can be partitioned in A∗∗ and A\A∗∗ in such a way that for
all actions a ∈ A∗∗ and a′ ∈ A\A∗∗, we have that Fa sfosd Fa′ , then the set of rules
that satisfy p′(A∗∗) ≥ p(A∗∗), with strict inequality when p(A∗) ∈ (0, 1), in every
environment, is equivalent to the set of FOM rules.6
6Clearly every rule that satisfies p′(A∗∗) ≥ p(A∗∗) ,in every environment, with strict
inequality in when p(A∗∗) ∈ (0, 1) has to be FOM. The fact that FOM rules satisfy
p′(A∗∗) ≥ p(A∗∗) in every environment, with strict inequality when p(A∗∗) ∈ (0, 1), fol-
lows directly from Lemma 6, Lemma 7, and straightforward algebraic manipulations.
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D. Large Population Dynamics
In this section we analyze the dynamics of the fraction of the population playing an
optimal action in large populations. We show that, with a probability arbitrarily
close to one, the fraction of the population that plays an optimal action is arbitrarily
close to one after a finite number of periods, provided that the population is large
enough and decision makers use a FOM rule.
In the rest of this section we will assume that Pr(cd) does not depend on c, d for
all c, d ∈ W . We will also assume that the sampling process is independent7. We use
these assumptions below, when we approximate the behavior of a finite population
by analyzing the dynamics of a population that is a continuum.
First, we introduce the dynamic system
pt+1a =
∑
a′∈A
∑
a′′∈A
pta′p
t
a′′L
a
a′a′′ , ∀ a ∈ A, t = 0, 1, ....
with p0a ∈ [0, 1] given ∀ a ∈ A and
∑
a∈A p
0
a = 1. This system is called the dynamics
of infinite populations because this expression can be interpreted as the motion equa-
tion of the fraction of the population that plays action a in a population that is a
continuum: for each action a′ ∈ A, the fraction of the population that plays action a′
in this period and a in the next period is given by pta′
∑
a′′∈A p
t
a′′L
a
a′a′′ . Adding across
actions a′ ∈ A, we obtain that the total fraction of the population that will play
action a in the next period, pt+1a , corresponds to the expression above. The fraction
of the population that plays an action in A∗ at time t will be denoted by pt(A∗). In
other words, pt(A∗) :=
∑
a∈A∗ p
t
a.
7Independent sampling means that the joint probability of the events c samples d
and d samples c is given by Pr(cd) Pr(dc) for all c, d ∈ W such that c 6= d.
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Remark 6 If L is imitative, then the dynamics of infinite populations can be simpli-
fied to
pt+1a = p
t
a + p
t
a
∑
a′∈A
pta′(L
a
a′a − La
′
aa′), ∀ a ∈ A, t = 0, 1, .... (4.17)
The next result shows that, if the imitation rule used by the population is FOM,
then, pt(A∗) converges to one for the dynamics of infinite populations.
Lemma 9 Let L be a FOM rule and assume that p0(A∗) > 0. Then the dynamics of
infinite populations satisfy limt→∞pt(A∗) = 1.
Proof. Suppose that p0(A∗) > 0. Since L is FOM, the sequence {pt(A∗)}∞t=1 is
monotonically increasing and bounded by 1. Thus, it is sufficient to prove that 1 is
the least upper bound of this sequence. Suppose that the least upper bound is p∗ < 1.
Let
γ := min
a∈A∗,a′∈A\A∗
{Laa′a − La
′
aa′} · (1− p∗) > 0. (4.18)
Then, we obtain that
pt+1(A∗) =
∑
a∈A∗(p
t
a + p
t
a
∑
a′∈A\A∗p
t
a′(L
a
a′a − La′aa′))
≥ pt(A∗) +∑a∈A∗p0aγ. (4.19)
Since
∑
a∈A∗p
0
aγ > 0, this causes a contradiction. ¤
In our next result, we use Theorem 3 in Schlag [33] and Lemma 9 to prove that,
with a probability arbitrarily close to one, the fraction of the population that plays
an optimal action is arbitrarily close to one after a finite number of periods, provided
that the population is large enough and the decision makers use a FOM rule. Let
pt,Na denote the fraction of the population that, at time t, plays a in a population of
size N and let pt,N(A∗) :=
∑
a∈A∗ p
t,N
a . First, we provide Theorem 3 in Schlag [33].
Theorem 1 (Schlag [33]) Assume that the sampling process is independent and that
Pr(cd) does not depend on c or d for all c 6= d ∈ W. Assume that all individuals use
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the rule L and p0,Na = p
0
afor all a ∈ A. Then, for every ε, δ > 0, T ∈ {1, 2, ...}, and
(p0,Na )a∈A, there exists N0 ∈ {1, 2, ...} such that for any population of size N > N0,
the event {[∑a∈A(pT,Na − pTa )2]1/2 > δ} occurs with probability less than ε.
Proposition 10 If a rule L is FOM, and p0,N(A∗) > 0, then for all ε, δ > 0, there
exist N0, T <∞ such that for all N > N0, P (1− pT,N(A∗) > δ) < ε.
Proof. By Lemma 9, we know that there exists a natural number T such that
1− pT (A∗) < δ/2. Now, by Theorem 3 in Schlag [33], for this T there exists N0 such
that for all N > N0 we have
P (|pT (A∗)− pT,N(A∗)| > δ/2) < ε. (4.20)
Then, by the triangle inequality, we obtain that P (1− pT,N(A∗) > δ) < ε. ¤
E. Examples
In this section we provide a number of examples of imitation rules that satisfy the
properties studied above. We also show that no FOM rule can be said to be dominant
in the sense of having the greatest p′(A∗) in every environment among all the FOM
rules.
Our first example is Schlag’s [33] Proportional Imitation Rule. This is an im-
itative rule that never switches unless the payoff of the sampled action is strictly
greater than the payoff of the action played by the individual. If this is the case, the
probability of switching is y − x. This rule is defined as follows: for all a, a′ ∈ A let
L(a, x, a′, y)a′ =
 y − x y > x0 otherwise, (4.21)
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L(a, x, a′, y)a =
 1− y + x y > x1 otherwise. (4.22)
Straightforward calculations show that gaa′(x, y) = y − x. It follows that this rule is
FOM. Schlag [33] shows that this rule has a number of interesting properties. For
example, it has the greatest increase in the expected average payoff of the population
among all the imitation rules that are improving.
Our second example is a version of the rule Imitate if Better. This rule is an
imitative rule that prescribes switching with probability one when y > x, with prob-
ability 1/2 if y = x, and not to switch otherwise. This rule can be written as
L(a, x, a′, y)a′ =

1 y > x
1
2
y = x
0 otherwise
(4.23)
L(a, x, a′, y)a =

0 y > x
1
2
y = x
1 otherwise
(4.24)
for all a, a′ ∈ A.
For this rule
gaa′(x, y) =

1 y > x
0 y = x
−1 otherwise
(4.25)
for all a, a′ ∈ A.
Therefore, this rule is FOM. As shown by Schlag [33], Imitate if Better is not
improving, so it is not expected to increase the expected average payoff of the pop-
ulation in every environment. Can we claim that any of these rules is better than
the other in any sense? Or more important, can we find any rule that is the “best”?
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The most natural notion to assess the performance of different rules is based on the
expected increase in the number of individuals that play the optimal action in the
next period. Therefore, an action may be said to be the best if the expected increase
in the fraction of the population that plays an optimal action in the next period is
bigger than for any other rule, in every environment, regardless the initial state and
sampling process. This is captured in the following definition.
Definition 17 A FOM rule L is dominant if p′L(A
∗)− p(A∗) ≥ p′L′(A∗)− p(A∗) for
every FOM rule L′ in every environment.
The next result shows that such an imitation rule can not exist.
Proposition 11 FOM dominant rules do not exist.
Proof. The proof proceeds in two steps. First, we show that if a dominant rule exists,
it has to be the rule Imitate if Better, which we denote LIB. This rule satisfies
gaa′(x, y) =

1 y > x
0 y = x
−1 otherwise
(4.26)
for all x, y ∈ [0, 1], and a, a′ ∈ A.8 Consider any other FOM rule L′ such that
g′aa′(x, y) < 1 for some y > x. Consider an environment such that µa′(y) = µa(x) = 1.
Assume pa+ pa′ = 1, A
∗ = {a′} and Pr(cd) > 0 for some c, d ∈ W , such that s(c) = a
8By Imitate if Better learning rules we mean any learning rule whose net switching
functions gaa′(x, y) are like the ones specified above. In particular, L(a, x, a
′, x)a′ does
not need to be 1/2 as in our earlier example.
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and s(d) = a′. Then,
p′L′(A
∗)− p(A∗) = p′a′ − pa′
= 1|W |
∑
c,d∈W ;s(c)=a,s(d)=a′ Pr(cd)(L
′a′
aa′ − L′aa′a)
= 1|W |
∑
c,d∈W ;s(c)=a,s(d)=a′ Pr(cd)g
′
aa′(x, y)
< 1|W |
∑
c,d∈W ;s(c)=a,s(d)=a′ Pr(cd)
= p′LIB(A
∗)− p(A∗).
(4.27)
It follows that if a dominant rule exists, it has to be the rule Imitate if Better. Now,
we prove that this rule is not dominant either. Consider the environment such that
µa′(.05) = µa(.05) = µa′(.9) = µa(.1) = 1/2, and consider a FOM rule L
′ such that
gaa′(x, y) =

1 y ≥ .8 ∧ x ≤ .2
−1 x ≥ .8 ∧ y ≤ .2
1
2
(1{y>x} − 1{x>y}) otherwise.
(4.28)
It is easy to compute that for this rule, L
′a′
a,a′ −L′aa′,a = 3/8, while LIBa′a,a′ −LIBaa′,a =
2/8. As above, assume that pa + pa′ = 1, A
∗ = {a′}, and that Pr(cd) > 0 for some
c, d ∈ W , such that s(c) = a and s(d) = a′. With similar calculations to those in the
first step, we obtain
p′L′(A
∗)− p(A∗) > p′LIB(A∗)− p(A∗). (4.29)
Thus, the rule Imitate if Better is not dominant either. ¤
F. Individual Monotonicity
The motivation for the construction of FOM rules is based on the performance of
these rules in terms of the fraction of the population that is expected to play an
optimal action in the next period. The analysis provided so far has not considered
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how the way in which each individual uses the information she gets helps her improve
her own payoffs. Can the construction of FOM rules be derived from the analysis of
individual performance? A first observation is that FOM rules are imitative. This
feature follows from fundamental characteristics of the social learning process and the
properties, in terms of social performance, to be obtained: imitation is required to
avoid that a population already playing optimal actions to experiment non-optimal
choices. In the analysis of individual choices, such an argument does not apply. Each
individual must be exposed to go from optimal to non-optimal choices when learn-
ing takes place. As a consequence, when studying improved performance properties
at the individual level, imitation can not be derived from the analysis as we did in
the case of improved performance at the social level. Therefore, in order to derive
FOM rules from properties related to individual level performance, imitation must
be assumed –not derived. In this sense, an individual level derivation of FOM rules
takes imitative behavior as given, but provides the specific ways in which imitation
has to be implemented in order to satisfy improved performance at the individual
level.9 Formally, we can characterize a family of imitative rules such that, if the pay-
off distribution of one of the observed actions first-order stochastically dominates the
distribution associated with the other observed action, then the expected probability
of playing the dominant action is higher than the expected probability of playing the
dominated action. We call such rules individually monotone (IM). The characteriza-
tion of these rules reveals that, indeed, they are a refinement of the family of FOM
rules. Now we provide the formal analysis of IM rules
9Indeed, imitative behavior is sometimes considered as an intrinsic characteristic
of the human decision process. For example, see Cubitt and Sugden [9].
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Definition 18 An imitative rule is said to be individually monotone if Fa′ sfosd Fa
implies
(i) La
′
aa′ > L
a
aa′
(ii) La
′
a′a > L
a
a′a.
We can characterize individually monotone rules using the mathematical struc-
tures we discovered in the analysis of net-switching functions for FOM rules. Specif-
ically, we find that the probability of switching, L(a, x, a′, y)a′ , must be increasing in
the payoff of the sampled action and symmetric with respect to payoffs, in the sense
that, if payoffs of the actions are interchanged, the probabilities of playing them are
interchanged too.10
Proposition 12 An imitative rule L is individually monotone if and only if, for all
a, a′ ∈ A, L(a, x, a′, y)a′ satisfies:
(i) L(a, x, a′, y)a′ = L(a, y, a′, x)a, ∀ x, y ∈ [0, 1],
(ii) L(a, x, a′, y)a′ is non-decreasing in y, for all x ∈ [0, 1],
(iii) L(a, x, a′, y)a′ > 1/2 for all x, y ∈ [0, 1] such that y > x.
Proof. Suppose Fa′ fosd Fa. We need to verify∫ ∫
L(a, x, a′, y)a′dFa(x)dFa′(y) >
∫ ∫
L(a, x, a′, y)adFa(x)dFa′(y). (4.30)
But, since L is imitative, this is equivalent to∫ ∫
L(a, x, a′, y)a′dFa(x)dFa′(y) > 1/2. (4.31)
10It may seem more attractive to find rules L such that, when Fa′ sfosd Fa, the
lower bound for La
′
aa′ is greater than 1/2 for any environment. However, an argument
similar to the one in the proof of Corollary 3 shows that such rules do not exist.
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Let haa′(x, y) := 2L(a, x, a
′, y)a′ − 1. Then, the last expression is equivalent to∫ ∫
haa′(x, y)dFa(x)dFa′(y) > 0. (4.32)
The arguments in the proof of Proposition 9 can be used to prove that a necessary
and sufficient condition for the last statement to be true is that haa′(x, y) satisfies
( i) haa′(x, y) = −haa′(y, x), ∀ x, y ∈ [0, 1],
( ii) haa′(x, y) is non-decreasing in y, for all x ∈ [0, 1],
( iii) haa′(x, y) > 0 for all x, y ∈ [0, 1] such that y > x.
These conditions are equivalent to conditions (i)-(iii) in the hypothesis. ¤
For example, the rule Imitate if Better discussed in Section E is IM if and only if
L(a, x, a′, x) = 1/2 for all a, a′ ∈ A and for all x ∈ [0, 1]. The Proportional Imitation
Rule is not IM, but the rule given by
L(a, x, a′, y)a =
1
2
(1 + x− y) (4.33)
L(a, x, a′, y)a′ =
1
2
(1 + y − x) (4.34)
is both improving and IM. The following remark follows from Proposition 12 (and
Proposition 9).
Remark 7 If every individual in the population use the same IM rule, then p′(A∗) ≥
p(A∗) in every environment, with strict inequality when p(A∗) ∈ (0, 1).
G. Second-Order Monotonicity
A natural extension of the analysis provided above relates to the concept of second-
order stochastic dominance. When payoffs are monetary, very often decision makers
are concerned about risk. Usually this concern leads them to refrain from playing
actions providing higher expected payoffs when they are associated with a higher
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risk. Are there specific features that one can impose on imitation rules in order
to lead the population to rational choice consistent with risk aversion? In order
to introduce such concerns, a similar analysis to the one provided for first-order
stochastic dominance and FOM rules can be developed for second-order stochastic
dominance. This analysis reveals the conditions that need to be imposed on rules so
that they lead the population to make safer choices. Formally, we can characterize a
family of rules such that, in environments where all the actions have the same expected
payoffs, the expected fraction of the population playing in the next period an action
that second-order stochastically dominates all the other actions in the set is higher
than that fraction in the current period. We call such rules second-order monotone
(SOM) and we characterize them. The characterization of SOM rules is analogous
to the characterization of FOM rules, except that the net-switching functions are
concave instead of increasing in the payoff of the action that receives the probability.
It follows that an interesting subset of FOM rules is the one with rules that are both
FOM and SOM at the same time, i.e., those with increasing, concave net-switching
functions. These rules lead to rational choice in the sense of first-order monotonicity
and, at the same time, are consistent with risk-averse decision making.
In order to isolate risk attitudes, in this section we consider properties of rules
in environments where the expected payoff of the distributions of different actions is
the same. This is the only class of environments we consider in this section. In what
follows, second-order stochastic dominance, abbreviated by Fa sosd Fa′ , means that∫ x
0
Fa′(t)− Fa(t)dt ≥ 0 for all x ∈ [0, 1]. We start by defining the set of actions that
would be preferred for risk-averse decision makers, i.e., the set of actions whose pay-
off distribution second-order stochastically dominates the distributions of the other
actions in the set. Let A∗ := {a ∈ A : Fa sosd Fa′ ∀ a′ ∈ A}.
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Definition 19 A rule L is said to be second-order monotone (SOM) if p′(A∗) ≥
p(A∗) in every environment where all the actions have the same expected payoff.
Since the structure of the definition of SOM rules is analogous to that of FOM
rules, they can be characterized in an analogous way. This characterization is provided
in Lemma 10 and Proposition 1311.
Lemma 10 A rule L is SOM if and only if it satisfies the following conditions:
(i) L is imitative,
(ii) Fa′ sosd Fa ⇒ La′aa′ − Laa′a ≥ 0, ∀ a, a′ ∈ A, in every environment.
Proof. Sufficiency is proved analogously to the proof of sufficiency in Lemma 1.
Necessity of (i):
Consider the SOM rule L. Let x, y ∈ [0, 1]; a, a′, a′′ ∈ A, a′′ /∈ {a, a′}. Suppose
L(a, x, a′, y)a′′ > 0. Consider an environment where Fa = Fa′ , µa(x) = µa(y) =
µa(1/2) = 1/3, and for all a
′′′ ∈ A\{a, a′}, µa′′′(x) = µa′′′(y) = 1/3 and µa′′′(1/4) =
µa′′′(3/4) = 1/6. It follows that A∗ = {a, a′}. Assume that p(A∗) = 1. Suppose that
there are c, d ∈ W such that Pr(cd) > 0, s(c) = a, and s(d) = a′, then p′(A∗) < 1.
Thus, L has to be imitative.
Necessity of (ii):
Suppose that for some a, a′ ∈ A, Fa′ sosd Fa, but La′aa′ − Laa′a < 0. Suppose
a′ ∈ A∗. Consider ε ∈ (0, 1). If µa(1) = 1 for all a ∈ A, then consider the modified
environment F̂ such that µ̂a(1) = 1 − ε and µ̂a(y) = ε for some y ∈ [0, 1), for all
a ∈ A. If µa(0) = 1 for all a ∈ A, then consider the modified environment F̂ such that
µ̂a(0) = 1 − ε and µ̂a(y) = ε for some y ∈ (0, 1], for all a ∈ A. Otherwise just let F̂
11As in EUT, the analysis of SOM rules is easier to carry on when properties are
stated in terms of weak inequalities.
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= F. Denote by pi the expected value of the distributions in the environment F̂ . Now
consider the new modified environment F˜ such that for any interval I ⊆ [0, 1]\{pi},
µ˜a′(I) = (1 − ε)µ̂a′(I), µ˜a′(pi) = µ̂a′(pi) + εµ̂a′([0, 1]\{pi}); for any interval I ⊆ (0, 1),
µ˜a′′′(I) = (1− ε)µ̂a′′′(I), µ˜a′′′(1) = (1− ε)µ̂a′′′(1) + εpi, and µ˜a′′′(0) = (1− ε)µ̂a′′′(0) +
ε(1 − pi) for all a′′′ ∈ A\{a′}. In this new environment A˜∗ = {a′}. Now, conclude as
in Lemma 7. ¤
From Lemma 10, it is clear that SOM rules are impartial.
Proposition 13 L is SOM if and only if it satisfies the following conditions:
(i) L is imitative,
(ii) for all a, a′ ∈ A, the net-switching function gaa′(x, y) satisfies:
(ii.1) gaa′(x, y) = −gaa′(y, x), ∀ x, y ∈ [0, 1]
(ii.2) gaa′(x, y) is concave in y, for all x ∈ [0, 1].
Proof. Sufficiency and the necessity of the condition (ii.1) can be proven in the same
way as in Proposition 9. Now we prove that gaa′(x, y) is concave with respect to y
for SOM rules. Suppose that for some x, y′, y, λ ∈ [0, 1], and y′′ ≡ λy + (1− λ)y′ we
have that
gaa′(x, y
′′) < λgaa′(x, y) + (1− λ)gaa′(x, y′). (4.35)
Consider an environment where µa(x) = µa′(x) = 1−ε, µa(y) = λε, µa(y′) = ε(1−λ),
µa′(y
′′) = ε, and notice that Fa′ sosd Fa. Lemma 10 and condition (ii.1) imply
0 ≤ La′aa′ − Laa′a
= (1− ε)2gaa′(x, x) + (1− ε)εgaa′(x, y′′) + (1− ε)λεgaa′(y, x)
+(1− ε)ε(1− λ)gaa′(y′, x) + λε2gaa′(y, y′′) + (1− λ)ε2gaa′(y′, y′′)
= ε[λεgaa′(y, y
′′) + (1− λ)εgaa′(y′, y′′)
+(1− ε){gaa′(x, y′′)− λgaa′(x, y)− (1− λ)gaa′(x, y′)}].
(4.36)
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By our hypothesis, the term inside the brackets {.} is negative. Thus, for small
enough ε, the term inside the brackets [.] is negative, causing a contradiction. ¤
The following corollary completes the analogy between the characterizations of
FOM and SOM rules and it follows directly from condition (ii) of Proposition 13.
Corollary 5 If L is SOM then gaa′(x, y) is convex in x, for all y ∈ [0, 1].
H. Discussion
In this section we consider possible directions for future research. As explained in
the introduction, our motivation to study FOM rules was identifying a set of learn-
ing rules that lead individuals to choose actions in a way that is consistent with the
decisions of fully-informed rational agents. However, one can think about a motiva-
tion for FOM rules based on arguments related to evolutionary theory. For example,
Schlag’s [33] improving rules are motivated by their performance under selection pres-
sure. If survival of imitation rules depends on their average payoff, then a successful
rule must be able to lead decision towards expected payoff maximising actions. An
interesting direction for further research is finding the conditions under which FOM
rules may prevail under selection pressure. More specifically, it would be interesting
to find the specific ways (if any) in which survival must be determined in order to
allow FOM rules to be dominant. The analysis in Robson [27] is also related.
A restrictive feature in our analysis is the assumption that the payoff-distributions
associated to the different actions are the same for all individuals in the population.
In many settings one would like to allow for different payoff distributions for agents
with different characteristics. In Ellison and Fudenberg [14] heterogeneity of the pop-
ulation makes it harder for a social learning process to lead the population to play the
action that provides the highest expected payoff. Future research could extend the
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analysis to allow for this possibility and try to identify rules that lead to (expected)
better decisions in the future in heterogeneous environments. Future research could
also identify and characterize properties based on notions analogous to the ones stud-
ied in this essay, but suitable to the information contexts of different models, for
example when two or more other individuals are sampled.
Our concept of FOM rules serves to provide a foundation for a number of im-
itation rules in the literature, including very simple rules such as Imitate if Better
and relatively more sophisticated rules such as the Proportional Imitation Rule. We
show that among all the FOM rules, none of them outperforms all the others in every
environment. Therefore we do not single out a best rule. This non-uniqueness par-
allels non-uniqueness in rational choice. In our view, a next step in order to bound
the set of imitation rules should be based on experimental evidence. Future research
could test if experimental subjects use imitation rules that are FOM and try to find
out what are the specific shapes of the rules they use. The hypothesis of risk-averse
imitation may be of interest as well.
82
CHAPTER V
SUMMARY
In the three essays of this dissertation we have shown how the concept of risk aversion
can be extended to the analysis of decisions beyond the scope of Expected Utility
Theory. Decision makers do not need to know the payoff distributions of the different
alternatives to display behavior consistent with a suitable notion of risk aversion.
In the model we study, decision makers respond, in expected terms, to risky
distributions in a way that leads them to be less likely to make choices that are riskier.
This is a consequence of the way their decisions respond to payoffs. If the probability
of choosing an action responds in a concave way to the obtained payoff with that
action, then it is more likely that in the future these individuals will play safer actions
and will move away from risky actions. We have characterized the learning rules
satisfying these properties in terms of both second-order stochastic dominance and
the traditional concept of variance. This analysis was provided in Chapter II and
Chapter III respectively. When the analysis of risk is carried on in terms of stochastic
dominance, the response of the probability to obtained payoffs must be a concave
function for the action that has been played. When the analysis of risk is conducted
in terms of variance, such transformation must be quadratic. This is consistent with
the analysis of Bernoulli utility functions in Expected Utility analysis where these
functions must be concave to represent risk aversion and quadratic to represent mean-
variance preferences. Chapter IV of this dissertation extends the analysis to study
these issues when learning occurs in social contexts. Here, individuals learn form
their own choices and payoffs and from the choices and payoffs of other individuals
in the population. In order to display risk aversion, imitation rules must respond in
a concave way to the payoffs of the actions that they may imitate.
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While our analysis provides a significant step towards understanding how risk
aversion may be thought of in contexts that do not fit the Expected Utility paradigm,
we have not, as yet, illustrated how these ideas can be incorporated to the analysis of
decision in problems of general interest in economics; or how these ideas may provide
further insights in contexts that fit well the framework of our analysis. We leave the
pursue of this agenda for future research.
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